

## INDONESIA

*"There are 400 ways to topple a government,  
among them the employment of children to  
block streets and roads."*

*--Sukarno, in conversation*

### Summary

Indonesia's youth and students traditionally have been active in times of political crisis. The incipient independence movement of the 1920's, the revolutionary period following World War II, and the post-coup period of the 1960's have all provided clearly defined goals and methods.

Indonesian students have now entered a period of quiescence. Although they have returned to their classes, they continue to monitor government operations, paying close attention to economic stabilization, the forthcoming five-year economic development program, and preparations for the 1971 elections. In the meantime they remain both the army's strongest ally and staunchest critic. They sit in Parliament, operate their own press and radio, and organize educational programs.

### Recent Past

The attempted coup of 1965 heralded the appearance of youth and students as an *independent* political force which helped bring down a 20-year-old regime. Prior to this, Indonesia's youth had not shown themselves particularly independent or inquisitive. They were closely channeled by their adult political parties.

There were exceptions, of course. ANSOR, the youth affiliate of the Moslem Scholar's Party (NU), took a strong anti-Communist, anti-Chinese position far more forthright than its parent organization, which has a long record of opportunism. Christian students, many educated under missionary auspices often managed to escape the stultifying ideological indoctrination that permeated the state schools.

Such exceptions were often obscured by the clamorous leftist mobilization of students and youth against foreign powers "threatening" the Republic of Indonesia.

By late 1965, however, non-Communist students were exhibiting a remarkable ability for organization and independent action, often encouraged and supported by the army. Their actions were now primarily directed internally against a discredited political machine, President Sukarno, the PKI, and rising prices.

Long-standing animosities aroused by Communist influence broke out in the wake of a Communist-inspired attempt to seize the government. Communist China's alleged involvement surfaced resentment of Chinese economic "domination." Sukarno's early attempts to shield the PKI nurtured suspicion of his involvement and tarnished the state philosophy so closely identified with him.

The students who took to the streets were not all anti-Sukarno, of course. Some supported the embattled leader. Sukarno had early recognized the need to mobilize his own youthful legions and leftist student activists took a lead in forming mass pro-Sukarno federations. Eventually, however, these were proscribed by the military government on the basis that they were being used by Communist elements.

#### Traditional Roles

The Indonesian educational system has undergone an extraordinary expansion since independence, but the concurrent population increase and a rising demand for education have outstripped available facilities. In 1968, 35% of Indonesia's 112 million population were of school age; less than half attended class. Enrollment in higher education has increased at a faster rate than in primary and secondary schools. The current enrollment of Indonesia's 40 state and 150 private universities is estimated at 278,000 with about 8,000 graduating annually. With 42% of the population under 15 years of age in 1961 and a current growth rate of 2.3%, severe pressures are certain to continue.

The major universities are government financed and located in urban areas of Java. They are composed of individual faculties which are

geographically scattered and separatistic. The shortage of teachers and materials is acute. Salaries are low and most professors have other jobs, reducing their effectiveness in overcrowded classes. An official 1967 survey of 24 state universities conducted reported a ratio of 1 faculty member to every 728 students. Textbooks are not available or are prohibitively expensive, while libraries and laboratories are totally inadequate.

Universities usually do not have residence facilities and students must rent rooms or live with relatives. Most come from the families of government officials, army officers, pensioners, and teachers, and are two to three years older than their Western counterparts when they enter college. Many attend part time, working to defray expenses. Because of this situation, the lack of a standardized curriculum and an arbitrary examination system, it is difficult to complete a degree in the scheduled time of 5 to 7 years, and attrition is high.

A university education traditionally has been the passport to a secure position in government and a means of ensuring social prestige. Students, therefore, tend to study law and the social sciences. While a medical degree is highly respected, most aspirants lack preparation to complete the difficult course of study.

Limited academic interests and the value placed on a degree rather than educational training, have produced graduates who have little inclination to change the bureaucratic system. This has meant a bloated, largely underemployed, overextended civil service.

The first Indonesian student associations, formed in the early Twentieth century, quickly evolved into nationalist pressure groups. Sometimes they provided the genesis of political parties; members of the Bandung Study Club, under the chairmanship of Sukarno founded the Indonesian National Party (PNI) in 1927. As the Dutch became aware of the political nature of these associations,

student activities were curtailed and many leaders were exiled. The student associations were dormant throughout the 1930's until the arrival of the Japanese who sought to gain support for the war effort by creating numerous youth and student organizations which emphasized Asian nationalism and Indonesian culture. At the same time, anti-Japanese university students, while effectively penetrating the Japanese-sponsored organizations began overtly and clandestinely to advocate independence. At the end of the war opinion was heavily against any association with the Dutch, and Indonesian students enthusiastically fought in the revolution.

Independence and the departure of the Europeans left many vacancies to be filled by Indonesians in the universities and the government. The first students--a handful compared with today's enrollment--to enter the universities after independence were highly motivated by job prospects, the social value of a university degree previously reserved for an elite few, and personal identification with the spirit and goals of the revolution. Most students from 1949 to 1957 had full government scholarships and living costs were relatively low.



STUDENTS OUTSIDE SUKARNO'S PALACE

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As this revolutionary generation graduated, however, it was replaced by another whose prospects were not as favorable. The rapidly growing student population increased the demand for government jobs, and political connections, always helpful, became even more important in obtaining civil service appointments.

In addition, as the revolution faded and living costs rose more than wages university students became frustrated and more opportunistic.

Under Sukarno

While the Communist student and youth organizations have often loudly touted membership figures other organizations have been reluctant to do so.

Membership requirements are often ambiguous. The term "student" is rather loosely defined and Indonesia, too, has its share of students without universities. Both youth and student organizations have included members from 14 to 40 years of age, while student organizations count not only enrolled students, but also recent graduates or people who contribute time or money. Because of social taboos and the early marriage of girls, female participation has been minimal and usually confined to auxiliary groups.

Most of the student and youth groups are affiliates of adult parties and reflect the major orientations that are found in political life--religion, nationalism, and socialism, which included Marxism until 1966.

Prior to October 1965, the major Indonesian parties were the Moslem Scholars Party (NU), the Indonesian National Party (PNI), and the Indonesian Communist Party (PKI), all of which had student adjuncts. Sukarno's gradual move toward the left facilitated the growth of Communist and leftist national groups, while moderate political and religious groups were increasingly on the defensive. In 1963 the leftward thrust greatly intensified, and by mid-1965 only the army offered even minimal resistance to the nation's move into a Sukarnoized version of Communism.

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Communist Youth and Student Movements

The Indonesian Communist Party (PKI) courted youth and students to counter the traditional values and behavior that often deadened adult political life.

As with other Indonesian political organizations, the PKI differentiated its youth groups by age, sex, and education. Its most successful mass organization and the only one with which the party maintained open ties was its peasant-based youth organization, The Peoples Youth (PR). Less successful were the PKI's high school and university student front organizations, the League of Indonesian High School Students (IPPI), and the Concentration of Indonesian University Students Movements (CGMI).

In the early 1950's Communists gained covert control of IPPI, a student organization that had grown out of a wartime fusion of nationalist high school and university students. This resulted in a split which, by 1957, had resulted in two rival IPPI's--neither of which was effective.

Local university associations were begun by the PKI in 1950 in Bandung, Bogor, and Jogjakarta. In November 1956, these were brought together to form the Concentration of University Students Movements (CGMI), with about 1,200 members. Growth was moderate and in early 1960 the CGMI claimed 7,000 members, although the actual figure probably was closer to 4,000. By 1963, CGMI was claiming 17,000 members but this figure was padded by "students" from the Peoples University and other PKI-established academies.

The CGMI never acknowledged its tie with the PKI, and only a small percentage ever realized it was a PKI front organization. Many members who discovered its true affiliation withdrew.

CGMI exerted considerable influence during the early 1960's thanks largely to a convergence of national policy and PKI sentiment, which made it easier for the Communists to manipulate the organization.

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CGMI was the only national student organization open to students with no political affiliation or strong religious feelings. Most others joined organizations affiliated with the national political parties such as the PNI or the Masjumi. CGMI served to recruit and season young Communists. The organization was banned early in 1966 and many of its members slipped into leftist national groups where they would not be so readily noticed.

Much more successful was the general youth arm of the PKI, the Peoples Youth (PR), which had its base in the Socialist Youth of Indonesia and had been sponsored by the Socialist Party. The Socialist Party split in 1948 and many of its members formed a new Indonesian Socialist Party. The Socialist Youth of Indonesia, however, remained with the old Socialist Party and many of its leaders and members were involved with the ill-fated Communist-led Madiun rebellion of 1948.

Its name was changed in 1950 to Peoples Youth because of the Madiun affair. PR claimed 30,000 members in 149 branches throughout the country and embarked on an extensive membership drive.

By 1955 the PR claimed a total membership of 616,605--of whom 80% were peasants, 15% workers and clerks, and 5% high school and university students. Only 5% were female. By 1961 the organization claimed 1,250,000 members, of which 7% were girls. Claimed membership had reached 1.5 million by early 1963 and at its peak prior to the 1965 coup attempt, PR claimed 3 million members, although this figure probably was inflated.

It is difficult to estimate the number of full-time cadre active in the PR. Many doubled as cadre for the PKI or for one or more of the party's other mass organizations. Indications are, however, that the PR had more full-time activists than any other youth organization. As the PR grew, it placed increasing emphasis on travel to the Soviet Bloc, both for education and as incentive.

What attracted members to the PR was not so much its political activity as what its then Secretary General called the fight for youth's "everyday interests" and the appeal to "the everyday needs of

every section of youth, in workshops, factories, offices, harbors, urban quarters, villages, estates, schools, etc." Political activity meant little to the ordinary peasant or worker.

The comprehensiveness of the PR's program was exemplified by demands raised during its Fifth Congress in 1956. On behalf of young workers, for example, the PR demanded improvement on wages, social security and working conditions, abolition of wage differences because of sex or age, low-priced distribution of essential commodities, and scholarships from employers and government for technical education.

The PR also set up mutual aid groups to assist members in time of need and organized local "civic action" teams to repair roads and irrigation ditches. Through sports and social events, the PR provided activities in villages usually beset by boredom as soon as the sun went down.

All of this did not divert the PR from its political function. It sought to raise the "progressive" awareness of many Indonesian youth and students and passed on members to the PKI and its mass fronts.

The PR, along with SOBSI, the PKI's labor front, took the lead in mobilizing the September 1963 sackings of the British and Malayan embassies and the subsequent takeover of British enterprises in Indonesia.

Because of its long known affiliation with the PKI, and its direct involvement in the coup attempt, the PR was hit heavily in the anti-Communist purges after 1965. It was banned in March 1966 along with the PKI and other front organizations.

The PKI's youth program has not yet recovered from the 1965 purges. The party has attempted to establish a covert recruiting program, operating through its Central Committee Youth Department--mainly on East and Central Java. Leftist sentiment remains strong in these areas and there are latent animosities stemming from the purges.



Indonesian Students Abroad

During the early 1960s an increasing number of Indonesian students went abroad to study, predominantly in Communist countries.

At the time of the attempted coup there were approximately 1,500 overseas. About 1,000 were in Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union. Some 60 were in Communist China. There were about 800 graduate students in the United States. Japan and Australia accounted for the remainder.

Communist governments attempted to influence the students' political development and sought to dominate the local Indonesian Students' Association. Where an association's leadership might not be sympathetic, the host government would set up a rival rump leadership which could often count on substantial support from among the members.

The group most seriously infiltrated was that in Communist China, most of whose members refused to return home after 1965. They remain in Peking, shrilly demanding armed revolution in Indonesia guided, naturally, by the thoughts of Chairman Mao.

Of the 400-500 Indonesian students in the Soviet Union, about 100 remained loyal to the Suharto government and returned home. The remainder, staunchly leftist (either PKI or left-wing National Party sympathizers), had their passports revoked and either remained in the Soviet Union or drifted away to Peking and even to Albania. The Indonesian Government has reported the existence of 700 fugitives undergoing guerrilla training near Peking, although not all are former students.

It is difficult to tell, owing to Djakarta's inadequate screening techniques, how many anti-government students returned and are active against the Suharto government. There is very little opportunity for "underground" elements in Indonesia to employ propaganda tactics on anything but a limited, regional scale.

Post-Coup

Little attention has been paid to the genesis of the post-coup student movement and the establishment of anti-leftist student federations known as "action commands." Catholic and Moslem student leaders appear to have taken the initiative late in 1965. Their university student groups came together to form KAMI, the University Students Action Command, one of the most important coalitions of this period. While KAMI drew its strength mainly from religious student organizations, it regarded itself as nationally rather than religiously motivated.

KAMI may have been largely the brainchild of its first secretary general, Kosmos Batabura, who was at that time also chairman of the Catholic University Students Association. It has now been generally accepted that KAMI had the early support and protection of the army.

A government assessment in February 1966, when KAMI's activities hit a high point, placed its hard-core membership at 7,500. However, the group was highly effective in rallying thousands of students and gaining the support of many labor and professional groups.

Not unnaturally, student groups proved most effective in Djakarta. In many areas beyond the capital they often collapsed in the face of opposition from leftist, pro-Sukarno students and elements of the military, especially the leftist-oriented Marines.

The post-coup youth campaign was a fluctuating thing, often reacting more to the mood of the time than to any preconceived plan. Student hostility focused on Communists, then on Sukarno's ministers and close associates, economic deterioration and finally on the Chinese.

Insinuations that the CPR may have inspired the coup became more and more widespread. On 21 October 1965, 50,000 demonstrators protested China's "intervention" in Indonesia's domestic affairs. Foreign Minister Subandrio was charged with being

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a "Peking Dog" and if he did not run to Mao's bidding, it was enough that he occasionally had sat in his lap.

The students' tactics during this period were those so familiar to the West. Beginning with street demonstrations, mass meetings, and roll-calls the students turned to more direct action.

In early January 1966, students had initiated the boycott tactic. All university activities were struck until the government retracted price boosts in gasoline, kerosene, postal rates and train fares. Sukarno's installation of a new cabinet in late February 1966 was protested by thousands of students jammed into the streets of Djakarta, overturning vehicles and blocking the streets to keep the newly appointed ministers from attending installation ceremonies at the palace. Traffic was brought to a standstill and Sukarno was forced to bring in his new ministers by helicopter. Pamphleteering, radio, newspapers, graffiti, rock-throwing, the "liberation" of official buildings, and student arrests of government officials became regular occurrences. Fights with rival student groups alternated with demonstrations either supporting or condemning the "old order."

Student efforts at organizing often took a military tone, with the formation of brigades, regiments, and squads usually named after compatriots wounded or even killed during confrontations with pro-Sukarno troops or youth groups. While all this points to a certain amount of guidance from the Army, an anonymous student leader has said:



"TRY SUKARNO"

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"We learned how to organize and demonstrate from the Communists. We have watched and studied their methods for ten years. Unfortunately, we are a nation trained in Marxism... We have also learned a lot from the Japanese Zengakuren movement."

Sukarno angrily demanded that the students, especially KAMI, be disbanded, but his demand went unheeded. KAMI increased its coordination with KAPPI, its high school counterpart, and guided thousands of students in demonstrations. With the army's support, the leftist nationalists and other pro-Sukarno forces were largely neutralized. The Communists earlier had been destroyed as an overt political force.

The transfer of executive authority to General Suharto in March 1966 was preceded by three days of violence and demands that diplomatic relations with the Chinese Communists be broken: from 9-11 March, students invaded the offices of NCNA, the Chinese Consul General, and the Chinese Trade Office. Foreign Minister Subandrio's offices were also sacked. In May the students finally breached the walls of the Chinese Embassy.

A feeling that they, perhaps, were the new protectors of the public welfare, had taken hold.

Sukarno's fall and General Suharto's subsequent appointment as President relieved the students of their major thrust. They are now largely concerned with matters of economic stability, corruption, and a rediscovery of the world of which they are a part.

The search has led them to parliamentary participation. In early 1967 they were given a total of 18 seats in a revised parliament, divided among students and working youth. How many they currently hold is obscured in the confusion of nomenclature, reconstituted parliaments, and obtuse statistics.

More important than numbers, however, is the influence they exercise. Through approximately 140 "amateur" radio stations they bombard the government and populace with anti-corruption and economic stability campaigns and dated western

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music. Their major newspaper, Harian KAMI, enjoys a paid circulation estimated at 9,000 and it is no doubt read by many more people. It is regarded as a highly professional effort and offers some of the best editorial comment of any Indonesian newspaper.

The Role of Chinese Students

The attitudes, activities, and organizations of the Indonesian Chinese, both citizens and aliens, have been influenced by specifically ethnic interests. The majority have remained largely apathetic and passive, focused largely on day-to-day concerns. However, during the pro-Chinese and pro-Communist Sukarno era the Chinese became important as a political sub-group.

While alien Chinese were prohibited by law from engaging in political activities, Indonesian Chinese became involved with such "integrationist" organizations as *Partindo* and *Baperki*. The latter ostensibly was established to investigate ways of assimilating Indonesia's Chinese. While these organizations were essentially Indonesian and Indonesian Chinese, alien Chinese--especially the staunchly pro-Peking among them--found ways to infiltrate them. The national and provincial leaderships of *Baperki* came to be dominated by Chinese Communist agents and sympathizers.

The leftward course of Indonesian politics in the early 1960s was felt most by the young Chinese who were prone to identify with Communist China and more anxious to engage in political expression. Sukarno's concept of a "Djakarta-Peking Axis" made the policies of Djakarta and Peking increasingly indistinguishable and political commitment to one became commitment to the other. This virtually eclipsed the moderate or pro-Nationalist Chinese.

Many of the Chinese youth in the *Baperki* affiliates also joined the PKI's student front organizations. In early 1965 a *Baperki* official claimed that 5,000 members of the organization's youth affiliate had joined the PKI's high school students'


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front, IPPI. By mid-1965 it had become unpatriotic for Chinese youth and students not to engage in pro-Peking and pro-Communist activities. The attack on the USIS cultural center in Djakarta in February 1965 was largely carried out by students from Chinese high schools, both Indonesian and alien.

The reaction to the attempted coup of 1965 largely undermined the position of the Chinese and while they took to the streets with other pro-Sukarno elements, they were often placed on the defensive by charges of Chinese involvement in the coup and Chinese economic domination.

The Chinese will remain a problem for years to come. While several thousand were expatriated to mainland China following the coup and many more remain in detention camps, the Chinese population is still engaged in the day-to-day struggle of making a living. This has been made all the more difficult by increased government restrictions on their economic and social activities.

Nationalist China has cast covetous glances their way but its desire to influence this large group of overseas Chinese, estimated at approximately 3 million all told, has been thwarted by Djakarta's desire not to get involved with Nationalist China and risk losing what few strands of a "non-aligned" foreign policy remain.



ANTI-COMMUNIST DEMONSTRATORS BURN CHINESE-  
SPONSORED UNIVERSITY, OCTOBER 1965

Indonesian Chinese students are subject to all the uncertainties of a period in which the Indonesian government is trying to assimilate the Chinese community into the national fabric. For this reason, Chinese political attitudes seem to have entered a period of suspended animation, a retreat into ethnic non-involvement in the face of continuing apprehension.

The Future

Most student activism in Indonesia is today channelled through the political parties and through student representation in parliament. Much of the united spirit that marked the immediate post-coup period has been eroded, particularly by the strains of Christian-Moslem frictions. Moslem and nationalist political parties are waiting, anxious to advance their interests. Leftist nationalist youth and student organizations hunger after political respectability. While they are still in limbo, and their rehabilitation will depend in large part on the discretion of their parent organizations, they nevertheless provide a locus of unrest.

Indonesia now finds itself with a strong president, a somewhat weak parliament and an army that holds the key to stability. The student population has settled down after the excitement of Sukarno's ouster. The Suharto government has placed a partial moratorium on political activity which has somewhat undercut student activism. National elections have been put off until 1971.

It is unlikely that student activity will erupt in such force as to paralyze the country as has happened in France. Youth and students in Indonesia are largely accustomed to prescribed roles and operate within the security and discipline of the extended family and a highly personalized society. Even their often violent protests following the attempted coup were subject to these conditions.

One side effect of this is a tendency toward divided loyalties--especially on the part of Moslem student organizations, who feel the pull between religion and government.

In the long run, much depends on the Suharto government's ability to convince the populace that

it is working toward economic development. Failure to do so could lead to serious disaffection among the nation's elite, especially the youth and students.

Such disaffection would, of course, make it more difficult for the government to obtain popular cooperation and could produce a spiralling coercion-disaffection interaction that would intensify antagonism and open a breach between the student front and the army, its main ally up to now. The resultant loss of army support would leave a vacuum in the student movement which could be exploited by political parties.

Much of the same can be said about working youth, although they are not as politically active as the students. The Communists, who had the most success in organizing youth, are destroyed as an overt political force and many of the leftist nationalist youth organizations which belonged to the Sukarno-inspired Youth Front are mending political fences. It would appear that youth organizations active at the present time, sometimes in conjunction with the students, are somewhat more closely connected to political parties and labor unions. In the meantime, the student front, KAMI in particular, continues to provide a platform for a new generation of political leaders.



## IRAN

### Summary

There has been an upsurge in student unrest during the past year. Recent demonstrations appear to have been aimed primarily at redressing localized educational grievances and police reaction to student activities, and to have had no broader political overtones.

### Background

Political activism among University of Tehran students has, until recent years, been endemic; there were few years between the early 1950s and 1963 not marked by rioting and often bloody demonstrations. Traditionally, the activists have been nationalists, supporters of former Prime Minister Mossadeq, of his National Front or one of the offshoots of the National Front. The Tudeh (Communist) Party has also been heavily involved; Tudeh Party cells were active on the campus for 15 years. A few of the early Tudeh Party leaders were university professors, who retain a shadowy party-in-exile in Eastern Europe.

In the past, student demonstrations were almost all antigovernment. The Shah provided a natural target and the demonstrations were for the most part unabashedly political, with little attempt to use genuine student grievances as a pretext. The Shah's increasing confidence in the rightness of his domestic and foreign policies was accompanied--and perhaps made possible--by a strict suppression of political dissidence, including that at the university. Student leaders who promoted demonstrations were jailed, and officials of the National Security Office were openly ensconced on campus. Such measures, together with a generally more optimistic feeling in the country, have operated to produce a less openly militant student body.

### Present Student Attitudes

Many young Iranians apparently feel no sense of identification with the regime and its development

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efforts which are decided at the highest levels of government. Anti-establishment sentiment is probably intensified by the lack of an effective political opposition either in the universities or in the society at large. No political organizations are permitted on campus and the security organizations and their informers keep a close watch for potential troublemakers. Outspoken opponents of the regime have been expelled and drafted.

A university education is today probably the most important requirement for success in Iran. Despite their dissatisfaction with the political system, therefore, most students are unwilling to jeopardize future job security by any confrontation with the police over political ideology. In the past, many university graduates were unable to find jobs, and therefore had less to lose. Now, however, many of the brightest graduates are absorbed into a burgeoning bureaucracy as participants in the reform program, and the problem of an unemployed, disgruntled educated class is beginning to fade.

#### Current Unrest

Recent student unrest and demonstrations, therefore, have been aimed primarily at complaints about the educational system and defects within Iran's universities. Approximately 30,000 students are enrolled in nine institutions of higher learning. All but one of these institutions have experienced student demonstrations during the past two years. In May and June of 1967 and again in January and February of 1968 incidents resulted in arrests at the universities of Tabriz, Pahlavi, and Tehran. Pahlavi was closed for several weeks in February. The students demanded, among other things, abolition of newly instituted tuition fees, upgrading of degrees, higher university budgets, and better facilities.

The demonstrations had a number of proximate causes. Tabriz University, one of the first to erupt, was subjected to a complete administrative overhaul and reform following local disturbances--probably leading many students elsewhere to feel demonstrations could produce results. Students in Tehran struck in

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protest against alleged police brutality at Tabriz in June 1967 and again in sympathy with the Teachers Training College strike early in 1968. Students from Tehran University reportedly visited Isfahan University and encouraged demonstrations in February 1968.

Some government and security officials contended that Chinese Communist sympathizers were behind the activities, but this has not been confirmed. A few Tudeh Party cells do continue to exist at the University of Tehran, but there is no overt manifestation of their presence and their covert activities are directed mostly at staying alive.

Iran's universities are in transition, changing from a system of memorization and learning by rote to a more flexible, creative approach. Conservative, religious-oriented students find this modernization threatening. Thus Pahlavi University's demonstration centered around dissatisfaction with "foreign" teachers, and "insults to Islam." Other students undoubtedly believe that modernization is not coming fast enough and that their training still is not relevant in the modern world.

The universities have had difficulty in attracting competent and dynamic faculties, despite government efforts to recruit better qualified teachers. At Tabriz, for example, until this year's reorganization, the university was dominated by conservative, long-entrenched native Azerbaijanis with questionable qualifications.

Although the apparent student/faculty ratios at Iranian universities are not too bad, these figures are deceptive. At Tehran University, for example, where the ratio was 28 to 1 in 1966, faculty members have been only part-time teachers--medical professors with private practices, economics professors with their own businesses, etc. Some top professors reportedly have not shown up for classes in years. There has been virtually no faculty/student relationship. Professors traditionally deliver lectures and depart with little or no exchange with their students. The government now has banned part-time teaching, but it is not known to what extent its ruling has been enforced.

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University chancellors generally have won their positions on the basis of their ability to maintain order. Many are poor administrators, with little ability to communicate with the younger generation. Students are well aware of the attempts to keep them quiet; rumors at Tehran University that the chancellor was about to create a university-controlled student organization resulted in a pamphlet declaring that "we boycott any imposed trade union."

#### Outside Influences

There is little evidence of off-campus influence on student activism. Security officials, and in some instances university officials, charged that Communists were active in recent demonstrations; 20 of the 100 students arrested in the Tehran area in February 1968 were alleged to be pro - Chinese Communist. This has not been confirmed. There is some Communist activity, consisting primarily of the circulation of a limited amount of Soviet and Chinese propaganda. Some students may be receptive to this propaganda, but generally its effectiveness has been undercut by rapid economic and social development. Many students turned out in February last year to mourn the death of a famous wrestler associated with Mossadeq's National Front, but the front itself has been effectively silenced by the Shah's reforms and by security measures.

The US Embassy believes that in universities such as Pahlavi, which are located in less urban areas, Muslim religious leaders still have an influence over youth. About 50 religiously conservative Shirazi citizens were arrested following disturbances at Pahlavi in February 1968 on charges of fomenting the strikes.

There is no evidence that student revolts in the US, France, and other countries have influenced the Iranian students, or that Iranian dissidents abroad have had an impact on the local scene.

#### Government Approach to Student Problems

Iranian officials, from the Shah on down, are aware that the regime has not been accepted by many intellectuals. They are anxious to keep youth satisfied and to encourage students to support and participate in the government. There is no visible effort to

train youth for political responsibility, however; in fact, the government attempts to keep students from engaging in political activity altogether.

The government is trying to improve and modernize Iranian universities through increased enrollment and expansion of facilities, improved and enlarged faculties, establishment of technical institutions, and a more creative and relevant method of instruction. Further improvement is slated under the new five-year plan, but progress is slow--particularly when change threatens the university's status quo and is fought by elements both in faculties and student bodies.

The regime-sponsored Youth Organization has established a Youth Palace in Tehran elaborately equipped with sports facilities, a snack bar, and occasional entertainment. There are plans for similar facilities in other Iranian cities and for centers open to nonuniversity youth, as well.

Political and social pull--being a descendant of one of Iran's "1,000 families"--is still important in the rise to success, but less so than before. More middle-class youth are attending universities, and with the government's increasing emphasis on skill and technical competence, more of them are now able to get jobs without political connections. Of greatest impact, however, has been the increasing availability of government jobs. Both high school and university graduates are employed in large numbers in the Literacy, Health, and Development Corps.

#### *Iranian Students Abroad*

Iranian officials estimate that some 25,000 to 37,000 Iranians are studying abroad, including 5,000 to 12,000 in the United States. Surveys have shown that many of the best do not return home because of better opportunities abroad, while average students are likely to come back. Most of the sizable number of dropouts and failures (only 50 percent of the Iranian "students" in the US are thought to be actually enrolled in schools) get nonprofessional jobs with good pay abroad and do not return to Iran.

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A degree from a US or European university is considered far more prestigious than one from an Iranian university, and many youths go to fantastic lengths to study abroad. For example, private enterprises in Iran sell admissions to small, often unaccredited universities in the US to students who are unable to gain admission to better US schools. Poorer students often seek education abroad because they are unable to gain entrance to Iran's universities.

A small but vocal segment of Iranian students abroad (an estimated 500 are in the US) engage in active anti-Shah activities. They hold meetings, issue sporadic publications, and make grandiose plans, but their major activity is to harass the Shah when he travels. Anti-Shah demonstrations, joined by radical students in the US, Germany, Austria, and England, among other places, have been a major irritant to the Shah, have strained relations with host governments, and have often led to supersecrecy and extremely tight security during his journeys.

The largest organizations of Iranian students abroad--the Iranian Students Association in the US and the Confederation of Iranian Students in Europe--appear to be a conglomeration of Communist sympathizers, National Front - oriented leftists, middle-of-the-roaders, and religiously oriented rightists. They have no ideological cohesiveness; only opposition to the Shah and the present regime unites them. The leftists, who tend to be more active, almost always assume control but do not necessarily reflect the attitudes of the majority. Most of the funds apparently come from membership dues. Those who are in the forefront of anti-Shah activities are well known to Iranian authorities and most of them find it impossible to return to Iran.

The government is also concerned by the so-called "brain drain" problem. During the past year, it has initiated a number of steps calculated to lure overseas residents back--draft exemptions, the promise of good jobs in government and private industry, and active recruiting for teaching jobs at Iranian universities. The regime may also be making it more difficult for Iranians to go abroad in the first place.

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The Long View

There will likely be no dramatic changes in student attitudes over the next ten years, assuming that the Shah's economic development programs continue to provide challenging employment to increasing numbers of university graduates. It is also unlikely that many Iranian students will risk political activism while economic and social advancement appears possible. Nevertheless, as long as political activity is proscribed--and it is likely to be for as long as the Shah is in power--the regime will probably not win wholehearted student support, and resentment of its authoritarianism, however benevolent, will pervade university life.

## ITALY

### Summary

Student agitation during the past 18 months extended throughout Italy. Except for the summer vacation hiatus of August and September, demonstrations, sit-ins, marches and other agitation have characterized the student scene. In recent months, secondary students have followed the example set earlier by university students and increasing numbers of them have agitated for their own reforms.

Student violence is not new to Italy. There was violence, reportedly concerted at several universities in 1962-64, 24-hour strikes in a number of universities in 1965, and clashes between right and left extremists in 1966. The last year and a half, however, is the first period when student unrest has involved the whole peninsula.

Recent disorders began with a sit-in at the Catholic University of Milan in November 1967. The most violent demonstrations, however, have taken place in Rome. On the first of March 1968, there were serious disorders and clashes with the police near Rome's School of Architecture. Both police and private vehicles were destroyed by demonstrators. On 27 April 1968, some 2,000 university and secondary school students demonstrated in a central plaza against the arrest of several School of Architecture students. The students used iron bars, chains, Molotov cocktails, and stones as weapons against the police. Serious student demonstrations, sometimes involving as many as 10,000 marchers, have also taken place during the past 18 months in Bologna, Florence, Genoa, Milan, Naples, Padua, Palermo, Trieste, Turin and Venice. Several hundred people have been wounded in clashes with the police.

### Degree of Participation

An average of about 10 percent of the students in the 34 Italian universities has been active in






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the demonstrations. Proportions have varied considerably, however, from a third of the student body at Palermo to a few isolated students at one of the very small universities.

The majority of students are not activist, but they have either been sympathetic with the minority or silent about their opposition. Press and public opinion have generally been sympathetic to the students, largely because of the recognized inadequacies of the university, but are now becoming somewhat impatient with the excesses of some demonstrators.

#### The Objectives

Student agitation is directed primarily toward educational reform, but there is some evidence of a broader dissatisfaction with the "system." Possibly in line with modern anarchist thought, young Italians often seem uncertain of the objectives they seek, and lack both organization and over-all leadership. Their specific demands are an admixture of local complaints--which provide a spark for trouble--and deep-seated, often long-discussed grievances over the antiquated character of the curriculum, the inadequacy of buildings, and the crippling lack of facilities for scientific and technical training. With these complaints go demands for far greater participation by the students in the actual running of the university and criticism of the government's inflexibility.

#### Causes of Student Agitation

A basic cause of agitation in Italy is the rise in the number of university students. While in elementary school the increase in students is only slightly in excess of the general population growth, 20 percent more enrolled in a single recent year for the first year of study for university degrees. The relatively static number of professors and an outdated curriculum have added to frustration. At Rome, for example, many students believe that it is absurd for them to be forced to achieve competence in the Latin of ancient Rome; but the requirement cannot be abolished except by act of parliament. In a smaller school such a requirement can be evaded by faculty-student collusion, but at Rome with 60,000 students evasion is impossible.

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The general mood of restlessness has proved infectious. Disaffected youth, known locally as "capelloni" (the long-haired ones) were first noticeable in mid-1965. Some 200 of the capelloni gathered from all over the country to demonstrate at Carrara in June 1967, with the support of the Federation of Italian Anarchist Youth. They were also in evidence at the small International Anarchist Congress at Carrara in September 1968.

The extremists, with their rejection of all political order, their exasperated search for "direct democracy," and the weight they attach to the social and political criticism of Herbert Marcuse, have gone beyond the limits of homegrown Communism.

Outside Agitation

There is no evidence of foreign instigation or guidance during the seemingly spontaneous demonstrations of 1967-68. Television coverage of demonstrations elsewhere contributed to some degree, as did the exchange of literature and "experience" with foreign students and between Italian student groups. The extremist leaders of two university demonstrations in northern Italy in May 1968 had just returned from France.

In Italy, as in France, the orthodox Communist Party was surprised by the student outbreak and proved unprepared to endorse the aims or methods of the student agitators. The Italian party, with a membership of over one-and-a-half million, has been in the forefront of those free world Communist parties that have struggled to minimize their subservience to Moscow and to attain the role of a more or less regular political party. The Italian Communists have reacted ambiguously to the student disturbances, trying to capitalize on the move of events while refraining from taking an official position on the violence. Leaders of the party's left have argued for a more militant stand, rather than backing away as they believe the French did, so that the Communists might take advantage of disorder. But most of the party, particularly its right wing, has been afraid that involvement in the student demonstrations would disrupt the party's long-term goal of winning a governmental role by peaceful means. The party also fears that the disorder, coupled

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with the restiveness evident in the Communist youth organization, could loosen its hold over party members in the universities. Communist youth increasingly are of the opinion that parliamentary reform is too slow a process and that the "Italian road to socialism" supported by the party's leadership "will lead inevitably to social democracy."

The Extreme Left

The political organizations that fall to the left of the orthodox Communists all have sought to profit from the student movement and to stimulate its protest activities. The Federation of Youth of the Proletarian Socialists is reportedly the most popular political organization for the student extremists. The Proletarian Socialists have put their propaganda and organizational apparatus at the disposition of those in the university movement who would accept it. Many of the young people attracted by this party have concurrently put themselves at the head of anti-imperialist Castroist groups called "Che Guevara clubs" or at the head of associations of pro-Chinese or Trotskyite inspiration.

The pro-Chinese movement, represented by the three competing organizations--the Communist Party of Italy (Marxist-Leninist) the Federation of Marxist-Leninist Communists of Italy, and the League of Marxist-Leninist Communists of Italy--of late has obtained an unprecedented degree of support in the university milieu. Previously, little success attended these groups' demonstrations, which were usually built around the theme of US involvement in Vietnam, complete with little red books and Maoist banners and maxims.

The Trotskyite movement is represented by two feeble groups and has profited little as yet from the student agitation. In one city, however, several university students have founded the "League of Revolutionary Students" which proposes to link student and worker power and to organize street demonstrations.

Pro-Castro sentiment has not given rise to any disciplined organization in Italy. There has, however,

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been an increase in the number of "Che Guevara clubs," where protest of a variety of ideological tendencies is reportedly expressed. A left-wing Italian publisher distributes a considerable volume of literature romanticizing Castro and Che Guevara and also disseminates texts on guerrilla methods and techniques. Several people in Italian Government circles have expressed fear that the spread of such literature could lend an increasingly violent cast to student demonstrations.

#### The Extreme Right

The extreme right--particularly the neo-fascist movement--is divided between those with a nostalgia for the past and others who stress political survival in a time of rapid social evolution. Thus the rightists are torn between the dangers of adopting so reactionary a line that they will be separated from the mass of students, and an association with the far left that might lead to their absorption. In some universities the far right led actions to evacuate or to prevent the occupation of the schools. In others, the rightists competed with the extreme leftists in occupying buildings. In general, however, the far right has not been a major factor in the student demonstrations.

#### Attitude of Moderates

The Italian students may have a better chance of winning high level support than student agitators elsewhere. For example, Amintore Fanfani, a key Christian Democratic leader, has given lectures at Rome which were based on his contemporary experiences as foreign minister and were designed to meet student demand for academic work relevant to the present day. Civiltà Cattolica, the influential Jesuit weekly, stated editorially that protesting students were substantially correct in their demands and new forms of democracy would have to be found to give everyone a meaningful role in society.

By early 1969, however, the attitude of the establishment toward the student demonstrations had become considerably more critical. Italian observers generally believe that reform of curriculum, administration and student-teacher relations is inevitable, given

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the increase in the student population. Demonstrations have given the government a sense of urgency about reform in education, but unfocused extremist agitation may now be delaying progress on legislation.

Prospects

Both university and secondary students are likely to continue demonstrations for some time to come. The extent and seriousness of their actions probably depend on two factors: the prospect for sympathetic government enactment of school reform and the degree of student-worker cooperation. This last in turn probably depends at last in part on the stand the orthodox Italian Communist Party will take toward student unrest.

The incumbent government of Mariano Rumor, which took office only last December, has given priority to educational reform in its program. It is generally expected that reform will eventually take place but that considerably more serious student agitation will occur first. Even after legislation is passed, the students on the extremist fringe are expected to continue conspicuous agitation.

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## PAKISTAN

### Summary

Localized student unrest has periodically disrupted the universities in Pakistan but has only recently become an actual threat to the government of President Ayub Khan. The violent student-led riots of the past three months that have occurred in both wings of Pakistan are an expression of frustration and dissatisfaction with the status quo--political, economic, and educational. Ayub's so-called "Decade of Reforms" has stultified development of political leadership and a feeling of unease throughout the country has created a receptive climate for student grievances.

### Background on the University Set-Up

Pakistan has 12 universities, each with a broad network of affiliated colleges. Theoretically autonomous, the universities receive official funds and are more directly influenced by central and provincial governments than any other part of the educational system. The total university and college enrollment is approximately 300,000.

Pakistani universities are organized on the British model. The titular head is the chancellor, usually an important dignitary and most often the governor of the province where the university is located, i.e. East or West Pakistan. The vice chancellor is the actual administrator, and overall control is exercised by a Senate made up of university and non-university personnel. Since the Senate meets only occasionally, the immediate working body is the Executive Council--senior university staff members, representatives of the affiliated colleges, and representatives of government.

### The Student Community

The Pakistani student community is as diverse and regionally varied as other sectors of the society. Although students are generally more leftist

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than the rest of the population, there are pockets of intense conservatism, such as in Peshawar. Across the country, students seem to have a parochial outlook and a simplistic and emotional view of the outside world. The causes that have stirred them to action in recent years have been political, regional, personal, or religious rather than social. The dissidents have always represented a small percentage of the enrollment, but support for their opposition views has been increasing as disenchantment with the establishment has grown within the student community.

Many serious students have recently become frustrated with the third-rate curriculum and instruction in Pakistan's pseudo-British educational system, which is designed to educate a small ruling elite. They recognize that the system is inadequate for educating large numbers of people in many different fields and that it does not provide the skills needed by a modernizing society. A very basic grievance underlying the general student dissatisfaction with the status quo is uncertainty about jobs after graduation. Students somewhat unrealistically expect that a college degree guarantees prestigious and remunerative employment. They inevitably run up against the hard reality that most jobs in government, as well as in business, are awarded on the basis of family connections rather than merit. All examinations are considered to be subject to manipulation and favoritism, and cheating has assumed the proportions of a national scandal.

Disenchantment with the entire corrupt establishment has made some students receptive to the appeal of a radical solution--Islamic "socialism" or even a Chinese-style "socialist" experiment--on the assumption that it would be more equitable. (Although Communism per se has made few converts among Pakistani students, Communist countries, particularly Communist China, exercise a considerable attraction.) The students' desire to change the system sets them apart from many of the older opposition leaders who want to "throw the rascals out" and take their places in a substantially unchanged social order. This accounts for the appeal

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of younger, more radical opposition leaders such as Bhutto, the former foreign minister, who has become one of the government's sharpest critics. The regime is reportedly worried about Bhutto's increasing influence on the campus. Bhutto's arrest in mid-November for inciting violence has only aggravated student discontent.


#### Student Organizations

Student organizations have existed in Pakistan since partition. Established to pursue both political and educational goals, the organizations have lacked full-fledged programs and generally accepted goals. They have tended to lie dormant until stirred by major emotional issues. They have found effective allies hard to come by, with the exception of a student-labor opposition tie of some significance in East Pakistan. Most of the effective student groups are subsidized by particular political parties--or the regime.

Pakistani student organization is fragmented and varies widely among regions. The arrangements are most coherent in East Pakistan where student political involvement is much greater than in the West and where violence among student groups is a routine occurrence. Three province-wide student organizations serve as campus arms of adult political groups. The largest and oldest of these is affiliated with an opposition party preoccupied with provincial autonomy. The second significant organization is affiliated with the Communists, but is split between pro-Moscow and pro-Peking factions. The weakest of the three is sponsored by and almost entirely dependent upon government support.

In Karachi, the two largest student groups are influenced by factions of a leftist party that has been heavily infiltrated by the Communists. Other Karachi student unions of individual colleges typically go their own way, although the fundamental Muslim parties exercise some influence. Karachi students are given to intermittent activity, but they can generate considerable pressures on issues to which they are committed. In Lahore, there are numerous opposition- and government-sponsored youth

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movements. Lahore students have been militant on issues which have engaged their emotions, such as the 1966 anti-government demonstrations following the Tashkent Declaration. Elsewhere in West Pakistan, student organizations are usually organized as college or department unions and are generally inactive. Weak and transitory student groups come and go with little fanfare, typically being sparked by a few activists with an apathetic following.

Students and the Current Unrest

The present anti-government unrest, which is presenting Ayub with the greatest challenge of his decade of rule, was initiated by West Pakistani students in November 1968. Students had begun marching and striking in a number of urban centers in early October. The demonstrations took on an increasingly political and anti-government flavor, although at the outset they were based primarily on legitimate academic grievances. Violence erupted on 7 November when a student was shot in Rawalpindi as police tried to disperse a crowd waiting to greet former Foreign Minister Bhutto. Bhutto, at the time was engaged in a political tour of West Pakistan, criticizing the government and apparently beginning a campaign for the presidency.

Rioting broke out throughout West Pakistan as other disaffected elements joined the students in the following days. President Ayub and his regime came increasingly under direct attack. An alleged attempt on Ayub's life on 11 November sparked a round-up of troublemakers, among them Bhutto, who has been in jail ever since. His arrest further aroused the students and aggravated the protests.

The disturbances continued intermittently, finally spreading to East Pakistan. Schools were closed much of the time, a usual procedure in times of unrest. All the while, students were involved, although attention shifted to the adult politicians when several former government officials joined the opposition. Still, the most active, unpredictable and volatile element in the protests continued to be the students, whose leaders increased in competence and control as they gained experience. The

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activists remained only a small percentage of the student community, but their colleagues joined increasingly in agitation against the establishment, especially in East Pakistan.

The demonstrations appeared to be running out of steam late last year. In mid-January 1969, the aging and quarrelling East Pak politicians were cowed by government threats and did not go into the streets for a scheduled opposition protest day. Furious, the students seized the initiative and the government reacted with repressive measures. The death of another student exacerbated the situation and rioting again spread across the country, with West Pak students overcoming regional antagonisms and taking up the banner of their East Pak colleagues. The army had to be called into most of Pakistan's major cities to restore order.

During these three turbulent months, the regime has used both carrot and stick tactics, offering the greatest number of concessions to the students in hopes that educational reforms would make them forget political demands. The repressive West Pakistani University Ordinance was repealed and the Student Union--a body of elected student representatives--was re-established at the University of the Punjab in Lahore. An education service on the pattern of the civil service was set up to provide incentives for the teaching profession. The concessions were too little and too late, however; the students' academic grievances had long since been eclipsed by their political demands. They are now vowing to continue pressing the government until all their demands are met, and they will almost certainly be unwilling to accept any compromise which results from the recently proposed government-opposition dialogue.

#### Prospects

The generation gap is an acute problem in Pakistan where Ayub's "Decade of Reform" is regarded by the students more as a "Decade of Corruption and Disparity." A new batch of student leaders has emerged from the current turmoil--leaders who command the respect of fellow students and who apparently are able to exert a degree of control over

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demonstrators. The protests have provided a way to develop leadership in the absence of more normal channels. Although the opposition leaders have happily ridden the wave of student discontent and espoused student demands against the regime, there is little evidence of student admiration for any opposition leaders except Bhutto. For the first time, students probably believe that they have become, on their own, a viable and effective political force. What this realization will mean for future student activities is as yet uncertain. The various student groups are temporarily collaborating in opposition to the regime, but Pakistani students have never been able to establish a lasting nationwide organization. Fragmentation among student groups will certainly become the dominant feature again. It seems likely, however, that disorders will continue until there is some drastic change in the political system.

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## POLAND

### Summary

Polish youth has shunned open conflict with the regime for over a year, but is as determined as ever to press for recognition, responsibility, and a role in shaping the country's future. It is doing so against a regime which young people view as opposed to change, jealous of past "achievements," and increasingly repressive. The crisis between generations now facing Poland will grow worse.

Fifty percent of the population is under the age of 25 and sixty percent under the age of 30. Polish youth do not oppose the basic economic or social tenets of East European Communism as such. They do not, for example, favor a return to private ownership, nor the reintroduction of the pre-war social system based on wealth and semi-feudal influence. They do, however, want far-reaching changes in direction of a more democratic model of "socialism," and the fulfillment of some of the promises originally held out by the country's leaders.

The bleak, grey facade of the Communist establishment seems effectively to exclude youth from meaningful participation in the country's future. The regime, constantly harking back to a history which today's youth did not shape and much of which it wishes to forget, is viewed as an anachronism.

The youth appear most to oppose the stagnation and the lack of movement, the exclusiveness, and the corruption of the establishment. The Communist framework within which these features emerge, with its totalitarianism, significantly reinforce these attitudes, but do not appear to be a root cause of them. This is particularly true of the ideologically unmotivated members of the younger generation who have left school. Most appear to regard Communist ideology as irrelevant to the issues facing the country--a dead letter with only its institutional forms still prevailing.

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Apathy Versus Commitment

Faced with the coercive power of the establishment, youth have become apathetic to the regime's goals and to Communism as an ideology promising consistent development. They view the established Communist regime in Poland today as a negation of the very ideas on which it theoretically rests. More than other segments of the population, youth have long been aware that the Polish party, like other Communist parties in power, has become the core of a stagnant society rather than a dynamic stimulant to change. This was made clear by the party itself, when politburo member Kliszko warned last summer that "anarchist-leftist" youth leaders in the "contemporary world" only fulfill a "diversionary role" on behalf of conservative elements against the "real" revolutionary forces of the left. In the eyes of Polish youth, the party's fear of "anarchism" neatly underscores its total identification with an intolerable status quo.

Generally, educated Polish youth tend toward a form of Western European social democracy as a political and social order, nonsectarianism in religion, and experimental freedom in art. They favor individual rather than collective responsibility in social relations, and their nationalism is tempered by vague feelings of supranationalism and a strong allegiance to Europe as an entity.

In terms of specific domestic policies, they make it clear that they want a free interplay of ideas, and above all, a regime responsive to public opinion.

This whole range of demands was clearly embodied in a declaration passed by dissident Warsaw University students in March 1968, in the wake of the first major student disturbances since 1957. The most succinct of numerous such resolutions passed by various student bodies that month, the Warsaw University thesis called for freedom of assembly and expression, freedom of political association, legal and institutional guarantees for such freedoms, true rule of law in the judicial system, the repudiation of and guarantees

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against abuse of governmental power, the abolition of censorship, and the repeal of repressive legal codes. It also called for popular representation in parliament, although it stopped short of calling for free elections. Finally, the students demanded an overhaul of the economic system and a thorough shakeup of the bureaucratic establishment.

Although student demands during the initial stages of the unrest were limited to issues of academic freedom, the 28 March declaration illustrates the degree to which these demands were widened under the stimulus of stern repression by the regime. The government and the party were faced with no less than a demand that they divest themselves of a monopoly of power.

The "March Events"

The student disorders and the violence from 8 through 23 March 1968 gave climactic impetus to a political struggle already under way within the regime and paved the way for a slow but irreversible infusion of new blood into the Polish party leadership by year's end. The demonstrations began largely as a spontaneous expression of genuine grievances in the academic milieu and related issues of individual liberties. The students, however, clearly were aware of the almost simultaneous political events in Czechoslovakia, and had been emboldened by the resistance of the Warsaw Writers Union to dictates of the regime a month earlier.

The relative uninvolvedness of Polish students in previous regime crises stemmed from the wish not to be sucked into the intricate power rivalries within the party. Most of the party's factions, from Gomulka's old guard to more hard-line rivals, appear aware of the "mischief" potential of youth and the uses to which dissident youth can be employed to advance a partisan cause in any factional infighting. Some party groups have courted youth's favor, even to the extent of placing themselves at the head of the party's critics. Others, correctly, see youth as the spearhead of a movement which could threaten the bureaucracy and as the driving wedge of "ideological subversion."

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RIOTING WARSAW UNIVERSITY STUDENTS. MARCH 1968

Thus, until March 1968, the youth tended to avoid actions that would have been exploitable by the party factions just as they had rejected occasional courtship. In fact, the inability and unwillingness of the youth to view any party faction as a true champion of their interests was the fundamental reason that student disorders in March lost momentum. Students maintained action as long as the whole regime, i.e., all the party's factional strata, was "shaken to attention." It soon became apparent, however, that the student movement was being exploited for intra-party factional purposes. Conclusive evidence emerged when clearly excessive police force was used and "hooligan" provocateurs were employed among the students. This, together with the early and false allegations of "Zionist" instigation of the riots, reportedly convinced most of the student dissidents that the party's hard-line faction, which controls the police apparatus, was more interested in having the disturbances run their course than nipping them in the bud. By the last week in March, most of the student resolutions and declarations passed at various universities throughout the country specifically included denials of "anti-socialist" intent and expressed strong desires to remain outside the framework of the "political arena," i.e., party factionalism.

Another major factor in ending overt student action was the failure to secure worker support. The regime's propaganda blaming the riots on Jews and revisionist intellectuals skillfully played to the residual anti-Semitic and anti-intellectual bias of the average Polish worker. Although there were strong expressions of moral sympathy from workers and other strata of the population, active support was limited to scattered instances of collecting funds to pay jail fines. The absence of an immediate economic issue around which worker discontent could coalesce also dampened labor support. In addition, many of the students--mainly those who did not take part in the disturbances--were working-class children whose parents evidently were fearful of jeopardizing their educations.

Regime Countermeasures

The impact of the regime's countermeasures against the students and the educational system in the wake of the "March events" has been uneven, and in some areas remains unclear. No complete totals for arrests and trials have yet been published, although it appears that the lengthy piecemeal trials



AUTO WORKERS CONDEMN WARSAW UNIVERSITY  
STUDENT RIOTS. MARCH 1968

of several score of student leaders begun last fall may soon be ended.

Party boss Gomulka revealed on 19 March of last year, in the midst of the student disturbances, that a total of 1,208 persons had been arrested up to that time. Only 367 of these reportedly were students. The remainder, according to the regime, were "hooligans" and other "misguided elements." Over half of the students arrested reportedly were released within two days. Additional information provided by the Ministry of Education by mid-1968 indicated that "disciplinary procedures" had been initiated against 424 students, of whom 111 were "temporarily suspended." This data, however, apparently does not take into account the 1,600 Warsaw University students who were required to re-register after the cessation of the student riots. Most sources conservatively estimate that over 70 of these were expelled.

The cases of another group of students numbering about 200 were dealt with piecemeal by government authorities throughout the summer, with the majority gradually released. Most of those released, however, have been reportedly expelled from their schools, many conscripted into the armed forces, and others required to take up blue collar jobs in areas of the regime's choosing.

A minority of this group, apparently including those considered the most active of the student ring-leaders, have been dealt with in a series of relatively unpublicized trials since late last fall. This course of action apparently suits the government's intentions to keep individual trials inconspicuous enough to prevent a potential revival of those issues which sparked the student riots, while at the same time driving home the point that no repetition of last year's events will be tolerated. What may be the last of the trials was in progress in Warsaw in mid-February. Most of the trials so far have resulted in relatively light sentences of 18 months to three years, with parole provisions after half the sentence is served.

There is no evidence that the trials and other restrictive measures against student activities within

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universities have generated meaningful new unrest among the students. The majority of the students appears to have understood the message and, with most of their leaders incarcerated or otherwise out of circulation, appear demoralized and apathetic toward any renewed anti-regime activity.

Despite this revival of apathy in the short term, there is considerable evidence that Polish youth remain on the watch for another chance to lend impetus to change within the system. In this sense, they are both evolutionary and revolutionary in their thinking. For the time being they appear to view open rebellion as counterproductive, given the repressive tools and determination of the "establishment." They are convinced, however, that the government has neither the desire nor the capacity to evolve without carefully channelled external pressure. Polish youth appears anxious to provide such pressure at the appropriate time.

#### Student Coordination and Foreign Contacts

Although there is abundant evidence of rapid coordination between groups of dissident students throughout Poland soon after the outbreak of demonstrations in Warsaw on 8 March 1968 no information exists of prior planning. The peak of coordinated action appears to have come between 11 and 14 March, when sympathy demonstrations and student meetings in provincial cities closely echoed the action and demands of the Warsaw dissidents. Then, after 13 March, when tactics in Warsaw were changed to concentrate on declarations and resolutions rather than on street action, student response at Krakow's Jagellonian University was quick. Elsewhere, however, sporadic demonstrations continued until 17 March.

Student couriers traveling throughout the country during the demonstrations apparently were the principal means of contact, although there was one unconfirmed report that technical students in Wroclaw had attempted to use a shortwave radio. By 14 March, the regime had curtailed student travel, in order to prevent coordination; some student couriers reportedly were arrested.

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Despite the arrest or intimidation of many of the leaders of the student disturbances in March, a viable, if temporary, underground network between students in Poland probably still exists. Following the cessation of all overt student action by 23 March, when sit-ins in Warsaw and Krakow were peacefully broken up by police, there were again reports of more sophisticated nationwide coordination, probably because of the relaxation of travel curbs. The fruits of such coordination have not become apparent, however, and it is probable that either dissension among students over the practicality of further action or infiltration of their ranks by provocateurs has short-circuited any plans. In recent months virtually no open resistance has been evident.

There is no hard evidence that prior contact with students in Czechoslovakia or elsewhere played a major role in sparking unrest in Poland, although during the initial stages of the student demonstrations in Warsaw slogans of "Greetings to our Czech brothers" and "We need a Dubcek too," were heard.

Nor is there convincing evidence that Polish students sought or that Czechoslovak students were anxious to provide any "export" of their experience to Poland. Indeed, by March 1968, Czechoslovak students were caught up in supporting and consolidating the new regime in Prague, having little in common with the problems faced by their Polish counterparts.

Nevertheless, the Polish regime, in late March and early April, added stringent travel curbs on all but official travel to and from Czechoslovakia to the general restrictions and visa curbs on foreigners, specifically Western journalists. Most of these restrictions appear to have been lifted by mid-April, although a careful screening of student travel continued until the invasion of Czechoslovakia by the five Warsaw Pact powers in August 1968.

There is little information to suggest that exchanges among Polish and Western European students influenced the ferment. Although Polish universities maintain lively exchange programs with several European countries, Polish students have remained relatively

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uninfluenced by the various student movements in the West. They are well aware of the writings of Marcuse and the ideas which motivate student syndicalist groups, but there is very little evidence to show that these have taken hold in Poland. Many students contend that the daily reality of "alienation" in Poland and specific indigenous issues facing Polish youth dictate goals, strategy, and tactics which can borrow from Western student experience only in the broadest possible terms.

The reaction of Polish youth, as that of intellectuals in general, to the invasion of Czechoslovakia--and more specifically to Poland's role in the venture--was one of shame, disgust, and in some cases frustrated rage. As positive and strong as these emotional reactions were, however, they appear to have been superseded in most cases by fears of cumulative violence in the Eastern European area perhaps leading to a world conflict. Later, these fears, in turn were displaced by a shame-laden but apathetic reaction to the event, especially when it became evident that both Washington and Moscow were intent on preventing the Czechoslovak issue from seriously affecting their long-term relations.

In some cases, the reaction of Polish youth to the invasion was similar to the more simplistic view of average Polish workers and peasants. The lingering bias of these groups against the Czechoslovaks, whom they tend to view as "Teutonic Slavs" facilitated an attitude that the Czechoslovaks had never really appreciated the voracious side of Communism, and that for the first time in August 1968 they were forced to face a reality much more familiar to, say, the Poles.

#### Students and the Educational System

Despite the rapid growth and democratization of the educational system in interwar Poland, schools of higher learning before World War II were still characterized by exclusiveness and overemphasis on legal and humanistic studies. Interwar Poland, therefore, had its problems with a qualified, unemployed, and "alienated" intelligentsia long before the term became popular elsewhere.

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One of the few real achievements of the postwar Communist regime was the rapid expansion of mass education. Universities and other schools of higher learning increased in number from 32 in 1938 to 76 in 1966 and the student body from under 50,000 to more than 250,000 over the same period. This virtual explosion in the numbers of educated youth within the framework of a system unable and unwilling to satisfy either their material or spiritual demands is central to the regime's current problems.

Children of the workers and the peasantry have made significant gains in higher education, although the party continues to decry their relatively low percentage in the total student body. Only 27 percent of the students are children of workers, and less than 17 percent are children of peasants. Since students from these backgrounds apparently were the least involved in the March disturbances, one of the regime's current goals is to increase their number, at the expense of the sons and daughters of the "affluent" or of middle-class background, who have been singled out as the ringleaders of the unrest.

Rumors that children of prominent party and government personnel played key roles in the March disturbances have been plentiful, although evident bias on the part of many of the sources of these rumors casts some doubt on their reliability. The children of influential Jews, for example, have been singled out for condemnation by the hard-line party elements for clear political reasons. It is true, however, that students of middle class and intellectual backgrounds did, in fact, play a central role in the unrest, and they have formed the majority of those who have been penalized by the regime.

Repercussions on the educational system of the student riots and the almost year-long intra-party crisis that followed were quick in coming in some areas and lagged in others. Influential liberal professors, other academicians, and scores of graduate assistants were purged during April of last year, with less publicized purges continuing up to the present. Many of those dismissed were Jews. Institutional

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changes have been slower in coming, but piecemeal legislation affecting higher education has been passed over the past several months. Its main impact has been to increase party control over the internal organization of universities, in most cases by abolishing the autonomy of institutional subunits in many university faculties. For instance, the virtual elimination of the traditional system of chairs, which permitted professors holding these positions significant independence, has been coupled to other measures that tend to centralize control over both faculty staff and curricula.

Organized Student Activity

The regime's main effort to prevent a repetition of the March 1968 disturbances is likely to center on propaganda activity by the mass youth organizations. The largest of these, the 900,000-member Union of Socialist Youth (ZMS), and the 850,000-member Union of Rural Youth (ZMW), have long been under the regime's direct control, and their effectiveness has been hampered by bureaucratic bungling and the unresponsiveness of the youth. The ZMW caters mainly to peasant youth in rural areas; while the ZMS has "academic" branches, its main appeal is to working youth for whom membership is a means of job advancement. Although the regime has tried to use both organizations as instruments of indoctrination, internal stresses and strains have gradually polarized their memberships into a handful of Communist zealots on the one hand and a mass of apathetic opportunists on the other.

Most university students belong to the 145,000-member Polish Students Association (ZSP), which has concentrated on catering to their material and recreational needs and has succeeded in functioning without undue regime interference. The ZSP appears to be divided into an officially approved leadership and a rank-and-file membership which pays little heed to directives issued from above.

The ZSP's leadership prides itself on its "cosmopolitanism," reflected mainly in the organization's membership in the Prague-based International Union of Students (IUS). A ZSP member receives an IUS identification card when travelling abroad. More importantly, there appears to be some interchange between ZSP and IUS leaderships. The present ZSP chairman, Jerzy Piatkowski--not a student, but a regime-installed leader--previously held the post of secretary in the IUS. He was replaced in this post early in 1966 by another ZSP functionary, Wlodzimierz Konarski.

Most students consider the ZSP, and to a lesser degree the ZMS, as useful vehicles for contacts among universities both within Poland and in foreign countries. Much of the students' more significant political activity, however, has taken place on the periphery of the ZSP--in various "discussion clubs," only a few of which are sanctioned. The small minority of students taking active part in these clubs nevertheless have proved infectious sources of dissent for the rest of the student body.

The most active student political groups are thought to exist at the Universities of Warsaw, Krakow, Poznan, and Lodz. Although the political views of student members range from "democratic" through "revisionist" to various shades of unorthodox Communism--including idealistic Trotskyism--they share opposition to various aspects of the present regime, and concern themselves mainly with discussion and promotion of political, social, economic, and philosophical alternatives to the present system.

According to one source, in 1967 there existed at Warsaw University seven generally "democratic" groups, two "revisionist," and five "Communist," together totaling about 500 students. Other groups have been identified only when the regime broke up their activity. Among these were a "national-democratic" group broken up in April 1961, a small allegedly pro-Chinese "conspiracy" broken up in late 1964, and a Trotskyite "revisionist" group dissolved

in 1965. During the student unrest in March of last year, the regime charged that students belonging to a "Zionist" group at Warsaw University, the "Babel" discussion club, were the ringleaders of the unrest there. It is these leaders who have been prominent among those singled out for trial this winter.

It is likely that the heavy hand of the regime has descended on all of these groups, perhaps forcing them to go underground. There are also hints that the regime may be planning to expand its previously sporadic and generally unsuccessful use of officially sponsored "political discussion clubs" loosely sponsored by both the ZSP and the ZMS. These clubs were generally regarded by students either as safety valves approved by the regime or as centers where students' political opinions could be monitored by the security apparatus.

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## SOVIET UNION

### Summary

Soviet leaders have, to judge by their speeches, worked themselves up into a state of high distress over what they call "the apolitical attitudes" of the country's youth. This "political apathy" contravenes the ideology of the Soviet regime, which defines every aspect of life in political terms and demands the active political support of all members of society. Moreover, the leadership seems to realize that what they choose to call "apathy" often represents absorption in less approved concerns, even with political questions of an unofficial nature.

As best it can be generalized, the attitude of Soviet youth is expressive of two aspects of its psychological condition, a mood of political pessimism and a preoccupation with personal discovery. The young suffer from disillusion with the political regime, despair over the possibility of working effectively through the political system, and lack of belief in any alternative to the system and its demands. At the same time, the young have been launched into a realm of individual discovery of personal values long repressed and of material comforts and pleasures long denied. While speaking with a Western journalist in Moscow recently, a young Soviet intellectual observed that for the past century in Russia every new generation has interested itself in something outside of itself: either revolution, or religion, or some special purity in relationships. Now, he said, for the first time members of the new generation, born about 1945, are interested above all in themselves.

The young in this regard, and also by their general acceptance of the basic elements of the social order, represent a force for stability. Interest in themselves, however, may grow into a desire to have the concerns of the young recognized within political councils. In early 1968 some young people

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joined a petition drive--the first organized, broadly based attempt at political action. There is little doubt that the young generation would make itself felt politically if controls were relaxed. How long the regime persists in its harsh enforcement of controls will in large measure determine whether the future holds evolutionary change or repression and violence.

For most of the young generation of the Soviet Union today, those roughly between the ages of 15 and 30, politics is keyed to the revelations of Stalin's crimes in 1956. The message of Khrushchev's "Secret Speech" to the Twentieth Party Congress affected no group of Soviet people more than the young. It is the central cause of their disillusion with the Soviet regime, their alienation from the generation of their fathers, and their loss of purpose in national and world affairs.

Stalin's mystical and terrible image commanded the allegiance of the people more than could any ideology or principle itself. Then, in 1956, those who had written verses in grade school dedicated to Stalin's "glory" were told at Komsomol and party meetings that they had been duped. The desanctification of Stalin caused an emotional and political trauma. A God had slipped out of their universe, and the question remained: what can be believed?

The question went to the very heart of the regime's legitimacy. Young people wanted to know how the Communist Party had permitted the sway of such a tyrant for so many years, whether his tyranny was not the product of the system rather than of particular circumstances and an aberrant personality, and what guarantees there were against a repetition of such tyranny. Acknowledgement that these doubts persist twelve years after the "Secret Speech" can be found in the report of First Secretary I.I. Bodyul to the Plenum of the Moldavian Republic Party's Central Committee in May 1968. Among a catalogue of problems concerning ideological work with youth, Bodyul

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noted that an improper attitude of the young toward authority is compounded by a treatment of the Stalin question that does not adequately instill respect for "revolutionary veterans and leaders of our Party and State." The problem was not helped by the public disgrace, including charges of administrative misrule, subjectivism, and "hare-brained schemes," heaped upon Khrushchev after his fall. According to its own history, the Party has been dominated during most of its years in power by a cunning demon and a willful bumpkin.

The doubts extend beyond the regime to the ideological foundations on which it rests. The revelations of evil have undermined the Russians' conception of themselves as the elect and their belief that they have a unique mission to remake the world that derive from the Revolution and their Communist scriptures, as well as from their earlier Slavophile traditions. Soviet intellectuals under Khrushchev were like missionaries without a mission. Furthermore, it will be difficult for them, and more so for the younger generation of intellectuals on whom the main burden will fall, to re-establish that mission.

The moral problems of guilt and sacrifices without justification have turned the young away from their elders and in upon themselves. "The campaign against the cult of personality," said one student, "did more than just unmask a dictator, it unmasked a whole generation." The only heroes that remain for the young are the survivors of the Siberian prison camps and a few writers of their grandfathers' generation. The camps are an obsession with the young. They collect the songs that have come out of the camps and their own poetry returns constantly to the subject. They respect writers such as Boris Pasternak, Ilya Ehrenburg, and A.T. Tvardovsky, who have dealt with the moral problems posed by the camps and questions of individual values and personal responsibility.

While de-Stalinization has been central to the disillusion of the young generation, other developments have aided the process. In general, the trend has been to discredit the official ideology and the policies that go with it by revealing the enormous gulf between theory and reality. The young generation has

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the advantage of a better education and a growing sophistication. In 1962 only 29 percent of the population in the appropriate age group was enrolled in general secondary schools. This percentage rose to 36 percent in 1964, and to an estimated 45 percent in 1966. Eight years of schooling are now compulsory, and the regime has the goal of universal 10-year education by 1970. In 1967-68, the total enrollment in higher educational institutions was 4,311,000--1,887,000 full-time students, 654,000 in night schools, and 1,770,000 in correspondent courses.

The awareness of the young has also been expanded by increased contact with the West through the medium of Eastern Europe and directly through tourists, students and cultural exchanges, and foreign radio broadcasts. According to figures, the Soviet Union was visited in 1967 by 1.5 million tourists and 189 youth delegations. Student travelers to the USSR number 180,000 yearly, and 24,000 foreigners are enrolled in Soviet schools and colleges. The Soviets claim that 200,000 young Russians travel abroad every year, presumably for the most part to Eastern Europe on vacations, in delegations, or with the armed services. Delegation travel between the Soviet Union and East European countries, although based on careful selection and a programmed itinerary, can involve large groups. A Czechoslovak Cultural Festival traveled to the USSR in the spring of 1968 reportedly with 500 performers, and appeared in several important cities; 800 Soviet students went to Czechoslovakia in June for the Second Festival of Czech-Soviet Friendship.

Western literary works are translated (in 1966 Ionesco's *Rhinoceros* and Capote's *In Cold Blood*, for example) and reviewed in *Innostrannaya Literaturanaya* (Foreign Literature), a popular publication among students. *Za Rubezhom* (Abroad) is a Soviet magazine that reprints a broad range of articles from the Western press. The choice of Western newspapers on Moscow newsstands is limited to those published by Communist parties, and many of these disappeared after the invasion of Czechoslovakia. Students seize what is available. An American exchange student remarks how students at Moscow State University used to rush down in the morning to get the British Communist Party's *The Morning Star*, the French Party's *L'Humanite*, and

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the Italian Party's *L'Unita*. They also bought papers from Poland, Czechoslovakia, and East Germany. *The Morning Star* was the first paper to inform Soviet students that Western Communists had condemned the trial of Andrey Sinyavsky and Yuly Daniel. During the trial, copies of *The Star* and *L'Humanite* were snatched up immediately. The US exchange magazine, *Amerika*, is popular with students, but the number of copies put on sale does not meet the demand.

Most other information from abroad comes by foreign radiobroadcasts. Jamming of Radio Liberty was extended to other stations, including the VOA and the BBC, after the invasion of Czechoslovakia. Nevertheless, the stations still appear to have an influence throughout the territories and among all the age groups of the Soviet Union. Nowhere is their influence greater than among students and intellectuals. Radio Liberty estimated that in 1967 40 percent of its audience in Communist countries was 30 years old or under and that another 28 percent was 31 to 40 years of age. The intelligentsia, including members of technical, scientific, or cultural professions and university students, comprised 58 percent of its audience. Soviet students report that foreign stations provide a chief source of information on events such as the defection of Svetlana Alliluyeva, the trial of underground writers Aleksandr Ginsburg and Yury Galanskov, and unrest in Eastern Europe.

Attempts to ensure the ideological purity and zeal of this new generation have failed woefully, a fact attested to by the constant laments of officials. Some students in secondary schools and universities are plainly bored with the compulsory courses in ideology and party history, and with the study sessions on the same subjects conducted by the student youth organization, the Komsomol. There are reports that they converse, write letters, or sleep during classes, if they go at all. Excitement comes only when the students take to baiting the lecturer and to displaying what officials call their "snorting skepticism." At one institute, this note was handed to the propagandist presiding over a dispute on the theme "Communism and I": "I want to interrupt you. Who needs your primitive philosophy interlaced with little quotations--your examples so distant from real life?" Complained one party secretary: "Today's youth is certainly different from those...of ten or fifteen years back. They have a different level

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of knowledge, a different view of the world. They don't like trite and outdated forms of political work."

The lack of relevancy to their own lives is the primary cause of the indifference of youth, whether workers in factories with incomplete educations or graduate students at universities, to the doctrinal lessons of the Party. Belief in the party line is eroded by its own flip-flops and by a knowledge of alternative interpretations gained through studies or contact with the outside world. Finally, for the more sophisticated, it is increasingly clear that Marxism-Leninism simply cannot answer the changing and complex problems that challenge society in such fields as economics, science, and sociology.

The political pessimism of the young generation is fostered also by its exclusion from political processes. To some extent this is an exclusion traditional to the authoritarian government that Russia has always known. Many, however, had been able to experience in the early years after the Revolution a sense of being part of the great enterprises of the time; such feeling of participation has since been largely lost.

An American who spent most of the 1930s working in the Soviet Union at a mill in Magnitogorsk notes that his fellow workers used to talk of *our* mill, *our* government, and *our* Party, but now speak only of *the* mill, *the* government, and *the* Party. In the thirties, young people could plausibly identify plants as "theirs" because of the good chance of becoming executives while still very young. Now the plants are more complicated and more highly "organized"; controls are more pervasive. The same is true of the political institutions, including the Komsomol. An American describes the Komsomol of the 1930s as a vigorous organization with a largely voluntary membership whose activities, particularly at the factory level, were supported by large numbers of young people. There was an *esprit de corps*, a feeling of belonging to the elite. There was some spontaneity and not a little enthusiasm in the organization and its activities, even though everyone knew that the Komsomol was run by the Party.

Mass membership and stultifying bureaucratic control have killed off these feelings, and the enthusiasm of the few has been replaced by the apathy of the many. The Komsomol has some 23 million members, including most

urban youths between the ages of 14 and 25, all those enrolled in school at those ages, and 80% of the army conscripts. In official eyes the purposes of the Komsomol are to monopolize the field and prevent any other spontaneous youth organizations from springing up, to organize youth for "voluntary" participation in construction jobs in remote areas of the country as well as production campaigns nearer home, and to cajole, inspire, persuade, or force Soviet youth into absorbing Marxism-Leninism and becoming loyal servants of the Party. A huge bureaucracy, including many paid functionaries, has grown up to enforce the Komsomol's program. Leadership in the Komsomol appeals mostly to the very naive or to the would-be party careerists. Most young people keep their distance from those who take these positions, and they especially despise the *druzhinniki*, the volunteer auxiliary police, whose duty is to maintain a "revolutionary" discipline among the young and to fight against Western cultural influences.

The young fully understand the power of the authorities and their own helplessness. Innocent attempts to form groups outside the control of the party as well as more purposeful attempts to demonstrate or petition authorities are quickly suppressed and have disastrous results for those involved. Simple dismissal from a university, for example, can mean banishment from cities such as Moscow and Leningrad, and the loss of any chance for more than a work-a-day career. Outward conformity is thus the rule. Moreover, it is the response encouraged by the entire educational system, which is based on theories that stress the importance of the conscious in human control and the ability to manipulate it while scoffing at the subjective aspects of human behavior.

In short, it is precisely this emphasis on the political (and political sanctions) and the state's monopoly on the exercise of political power that has caused the young to turn their backs on official politics. Common responses by young people to questions of national or foreign policy are, "That's a political question," and "They will decide it." Most of all they wish to be left alone, free to occupy themselves in activities of personal interest and to have politics intrude as little as possible.

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Finally, the political pessimism of youth is induced by the absence, in their opinion, of any attractive alternative to the present social order. If the regime has not been able to rear a generation full of ideological fervor and the conviction that they live in the best of all possible worlds, it has accomplished something equally, if not more, important to the stability of society--the rearing of a generation that does not seriously question the basic elements of the social system. There seems to be no significant body of opinion among the young that would favor scrapping collectivized farming, the de-nationalization of industry, alteration of the welfare state, political independence for the nationalities, or, even, an end to generally centralized and authoritarian government.

There is a relationship between boredom and acceptance in the attitudes of youth toward the government and its policies. When an American exchange student remarked to a Soviet friend how little *Pravda* was read by students at Moscow University, he was warned not to leap to the wrong conclusions. "*Pravda* is a dull, pompous paper full of propaganda," said his friend, "and you must read our more serious journals to get a more objective view. But that doesn't mean that Soviet people don't believe a lot of what's printed in *Pravda*. They simply don't like to wade through all of it every day. It's as if you had to read a Fourth of July oration every morning. You'd be bored, but you'd accept most of it."

The young do not want to have anything to do with capitalism, despite all that attracts them about the West. Although well aware of the high standard of living of the American worker, they are convinced that Soviet workers enjoy, for example, better and fairer medical care through their state health service. Although they will admit that full employment in the Soviet Union is achieved in many instances by underemployment, they believe that this is better than no employment at all for a segment of the population. Students cannot conceive of the private or otherwise haphazard means that an American must employ to finance his college education.

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In thinking about an alternative to basic elements of the social order, the Soviet youth is hampered, of course, by inhibitions in his mental process, by unfamiliarity with modern developments in the disciplines of political, social, and economic sciences, and by ignorance of real conditions in the rest of the world. The catechism taught in the school does not encourage creative thinking along political lines, the social science disciplines remain at a woefully primitive level by Western standards, and the many barriers maintained against the flow of information from the West obscure a person's vision. Thus, a student may mock his "choice" when it comes time to vote in an election. But when he replies to a question by an American about the two-party system with the observation that the system is meaningless in the US because both parties represent the ruling class and that it would be purposeless in the USSR because one party already stands for all that could be desired, he is, in addition to repeating the party line, probably also presenting the only understanding that he has of the subject.

Whether it derives from indoctrination, moderate satisfaction, or ignorance, the acceptance by the current youthful generation of the basic elements of Soviet society has profound implications for the future, far more so than the generation's present disaffection from political processes to which it contributes. It indicates that whatever political turmoil arises from this generation will be directed at modifying the system and will not be an attack on its essential features.

#### Awakening Interests

In frustration over political issues, the young have tended to withdraw into more personal worlds. This flight has been encouraged by the lifting of Stalinism and the consequent awakening of concerns long repressed in Soviet life. The "socialist morality" of their parents discredited, the students have undertaken a search for more personal, humanistic ethics. The fact that their parents made enormous sacrifices, often to no good end, has engendered among youth no gratefulness or desire of imitation, but, rather, an

insistence that a better and more just life must be had in the here and now even at the cost of ignoring ideology and distant goals.

Rare is a young Soviet who accepts his low position in society, who is not trying his desperate best to struggle up the stairs. There is often acute embarrassment among the lower classes over their humble status. The young display an aversion to physical labor and have a clear idea of what constitutes "dirty work." A 25-year-old worker, in his fifth year of correspondence courses at a technical institute, bluntly admitted: "I am studying only because I don't want to be walking around in dirt and swinging a sledge hammer forever.... I am tired of being shoved around, of being assigned dirty work. So much easier to command others." "To know how to live" (*umet' zhit'*, a favorite expression of Soviet citizens "on the make") means to achieve status, a comfortable home, a car, and other tangible symbols.

The results of this attitude are the flight of young people from the farms; conniving to be allowed to live in the major urban centers, especially Moscow; fierce competition for admission to universities, especially those of great prestige; and widespread study in technical schools, by correspondence or on a part-time basis if necessary. These efforts, whether undertaken by workers in the factory or graduate students at the university, are directed toward achieving competence in science or engineering, fields that offer the greatest prestige, remuneration, and freedom from politics on the job. To the extent that mobility remains possible, the competition is open and just, and talent and work receive their reward, this "rat race" effectively channels the energies of the young and, to a considerable extent, satisfies their ambitions.

Frustrations arise, however, because of several flaws in the system. Entrance into institutions of higher education is a highly competitive process. In 1965 there were vacancies in higher educational institutions for 20 percent of the appropriate age group in the Soviet Union (39 percent in the US, 14 percent in France, 7 percent in Denmark, and 7 percent in West Germany). For some of the more prestigious Soviet institutions there were as many as 26 applicants for one vacancy.

The competition is intensified by the popularity of certain courses, and many applicants have to accept positions in the social sciences, or, worst of all, in agricultural sciences. In addition, the fairness of the competition is undermined by the influence the party, government, and intellectual elite are able to wield on behalf of their children. The situation is the subject of many complaints and the cause of much bitterness.

Even for those who are admitted to the university and are awarded a diploma, happiness does not necessarily follow. There is a general dislike of the three years compulsory service that awaits every graduate of an institute of higher education. Often the assignments take students out into the provinces and involve work which they feel is inappropriate to their training. There is universal conniving by students and their parents to avoid the worst hazards of the system. Those who graduate in the less favored fields find that their pay is low and prospects for raises unpromising. Even engineers complain that their superiors assign them to dirty work in the plant instead of the administrative or research work in clean offices they think they deserve.

Many, of course, are excluded from higher education by their lack of talents, ambition, or "pull." Those who must work find themselves bored with dull jobs in the factories without recreational facilities and amusements after work. These young people soon begin to contribute to the drunkenness and hooliganism that plagues the regime. A growing number of youths from better families do not have to work and can live off the affluence of their parents. These the regime rails against as "idlers," and they are apparently another source of crime and unapproved behavior.

Beyond their preoccupation with material wants and career advancement, Soviet youth are involved with the rediscovery of themselves as individuals. Throughout society, but most strongly among the youth, there is a growing and self-conscious return of the repressed--a rediscovery of the personality denied during the long night of Stalinism. The

values of individualism, of questioning, of the religious spirit, of the ethical personality, of human relationships transcending party comradeship are returning to the Soviet psyche.

Youth's fascination with things Western--clothes, gadgets, music, slang--and their attempts to imitate Western styles are apparent efforts to break out of the impersonal mold decreed by the authorities and to assert their individuality. They appear to be trying to create something of a youth culture similar to those that adorn Western societies, but which has been long impeded in the USSR by the Party's control over youth organizations and dictation of behavior. Similar urgings probably account for the popularity of the poll or questionnaire which is enjoying great vogue in the pages of *Komsomolskaya Pravda*. The polls offer anonymity and an opportunity to speak one's mind not available at official gatherings, where conformity is the rule.

The concerns of youth are reflected by their cultural tastes. Two of the most talked about recent films at the universities were *Twelve Angry Men* and *Inherit the Wind*, in which the individual was shown in conflict with the collectivity, and in which the collectivity turned out to have been wrong. "Surprisingly, the most popular and respected writer among the general public is Somerset Maugham," notes the radical Yugoslav writer, Mihajlo Mihajlov. Above all, the Soviet reader finds himself fascinated by such of Maugham's heroes as Strickland in *The Moon and Sixpence*, who forsakes bourgeois society for the "heavenly beauty" of Tahiti, "still yet untrampled by the iron heel of civilization." An American professor who spent some time at a leading Soviet university noted that Salinger was popular and that in the fall of 1964 everybody suddenly discovered Kafka, whose works had been banned until the early 1960's. It was too early, however, for students to grasp all the implications of the worlds of Salinger and Kafka in terms of their own society. Nikolai Berdyaev and Mikhail Bulgakov (*Master and Margarita*) are the most popular Russian authors. Bulgakov, a brilliant playwright and novelist of the 20's and 30's, died in disgrace in 1940. Some of his works were finally revived in 1966. There is



a crush to get into lectures on Bulgakov, whose biting satire, flights of the absurd and Stalin parodies are widely appreciated. The popularity of Berdyaev (1874-1948), one of the foremost representatives of "Christian existentialism," and of his message concerning the world of the spirit and the creativity of the individual indicates the survival of religious values.

One of the most striking failures of the regime has been its inability to instill a fighting atheism among youth. Atheism is a satisfying creed so long as one is fighting *l'infame*, an oppressive clerical organization. But when *l'infame* is gone, and one simply has one's irreligion to live by, a certain disaffection arises with atheism, along with a distaste for its dogmatism. The result is an evolution toward a kind of religious agnosticism. There are reports of growing numbers of young people attending religious services, apparently more out of curiosity and for the atmosphere than out of belief. At the same time students do admit to their own or their friends' religious beliefs. Religious urgings are felt perhaps more strongly among the working class. The Baptists have gained since the end of the Second World War.

Much of the interest in religion stems from a potent nationalism not connected with the Soviet experience. Among Russian youths such nationalism expresses itself in a fascination with prerevolutionary Russian history and culture. A citizens' group devoted to restoring architectural monuments of Old Russia received publicity in *Komsomolskaya Pravda* during 1965. Youths from all over the Russian Republic, in a rare example of voluntary endeavor, enlisted in projects to restore and preserve old churches. The Party seems to have been taken aback by the mass appeal of the movement, for it quickly subsided, suggesting official displeasure.

Nationalistic feelings are evident among most of the minority groups of the USSR. Here, however, they take on a more serious anti-Russian character. Non-Russian youths, like their Russian counterparts, are annoyed by the bureaucratic control imposed on every aspect of their lives. But precisely because this control comes from Moscow, they resent it all the more and speak of it as Russian-made. In

Georgia a graduate student and a young playwright, angered by their inability to obtain Moscow's approval for a subscription to the London Times, complained: "Why should Moscow decide everything?" and "These Russians are impossible. They want everybody to be like them and what Georgian wants to be like a Russian?" Greater bitterness is engendered by Moscow's official policy of Russification. Pamphlets and leaflets circulate in the Ukraine filled with hostility over the educational and job favoritism shown Russians and the discrimination against the Ukrainian language enforced in the fields of education, publication, and official usage.

Among the cultural intelligentsia of the nationalities, the struggle to transcend the confines of "socialist realism" dictated by the Party is combined with an effort to play up the national heritage and patriotic feelings, which results in both an anti-Soviet and an anti-Russian literature. Champions of this cause in the Ukraine during the early 1960's were a group of young poets, prose writers, and literary critics who became well known as the *shestydesyatnyky*, The Men of the Sixties. The mood of protest is also apparent in demonstrations that frequently occur on the birthday of Taras Shevchenko, a nineteenth century national hero in the Ukraine.

Soviet youth have elaborated no well-defined philosophy behind which they can rally a majority of their number. Their opinions, however, contain common elements which suggest a basic similarity of outlook. An American exchange student came to the conclusion that the majority wanted "a more humane, more democratic, more efficient Communism, which would live up to its own promises, obey its own strictures, and abide by its own constitution." The suggestion that there should be more than one party, made to a Communist official at a Moscow University meeting, startled students in the audience who replied: "Don't ask ridiculous questions. Don't be naive." The American student found that Kossygin is particularly respected because of his frankness in admitting the need for economic

reforms and his caution in predicting future achievements--in contrast to Khrushchev.

The outlook of students varies, of course, most generally in accordance with field of study and geographic location. Progressives are more prevalent in the physical and mathematical sciences, which admit the brighter individuals and offer greater freedom of inquiry. Progressives may also be found in some of the humanities and in recently rejuvenated sciences, such as sociology, cybernetics, mathematical logic, and genetics. In general, the youth one meets in the provinces are more conservative and cautious than those in Moscow and Leningrad, while the Komsomol activists are more strident and dogmatic. Scientific universities and institutes at such provincial cities as Novosibirsk and Dubna, however, are centers of more liberal thinking. Radicalism at Kiev, Lvov, Tallinn, Tbilisi, and Yerevan is linked to nationalism.

Any attempts by the young to influence government policy are hampered not only by the vagueness of their political concepts, but also by their lack of organization, leadership, and plan of action. Reports of clandestine organizations, whether devoted to the study of Berdyaev or to terrorist activity, indicate that they are easily broken up by authorities before they can achieve much even organizationally.

Perhaps the most successful sustained activity conducted without official sanction has been the underground circulation of unpublished literary works and political tracts. For years such materials, written by prominent intellectual figures as well as by budding artists, have been passed around and recopied individually or gathered together and printed in various underground magazines. The magazines appear to be the product of loosely knit groups of young nonconformist intellectuals such as the well publicized SMOG group in Moscow. (The initials in Russian stand for "courage, youth, form, depth.") Official crackdowns on traffickers in this trade have failed to stop it. The American exchange student said "everybody" at Moscow University reads the underground literature, although

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he knew of no one who would acknowledge membership in any underground group such as SMOG. It may be assumed that this traffic, by providing a means of communication and a common enterprise, helps to foster a feeling of community among the young of nonconformist leanings.

In some ways it was out of this situation that an open and, by Soviet standards, widely supported confrontation between young people and the authorities developed during the past year. The widely reported trials of the past three years have been conducted against writers connected with the literary underground who sent materials abroad for publication: Andrey Sinyavsky and Yuly Daniel in 1966 and Aleksandr Ginsburg and Yury Galanskov in 1968. The first trial aroused general disapproval among the young, but no unified response. By the time of the second trial in January 1968, however, a form of protest was being elaborated and was gaining wide support. Its substance was a protest against the illegal and unconstitutional nature of the proceedings and a warning of the dangers of a return to Stalinism. Petitions were sent to government and party officials and passed to the West for publicity. The movement seems to have developed out of the trial in August 1967 of a demonstration leader, Vladimir Bukovsky, who pleaded the constitutional right to demonstrate and to criticize the government. Before the trial in January, some prominent intellectuals circulated a petition calling for open and legal proceedings, and at the trial a few perennial agitators audaciously distributed ringing declarations to the Western newsmen.

Within two months after the trial at least 17 documents had reached the West containing the names of over 300 signers. At least 10 of the signers were intellectuals of national stature whose names would be recognized at once by the man in the street. Another twenty or more would probably be recognized by other intellectuals. Otherwise, large numbers of the signers were students and young teachers, researchers, and engineers. The majority were from Moscow, but Leningrad, Magadan, Kharkov, Dubna, and Novosibirsk were also represented. An appeal on behalf of the rights of man was presented to the Budapest

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consultative conference of Communist parties in February.

The petition episode indicated the willingness of youth to enter political battle. For the first time an open, spontaneous movement was able to attract support among various elements of youth and the intelligentsia and to gain a life and momentum of its own. Motivation came not so much out of sympathy for the accused as out of an emotional reaction to the repressive turn of government policy and to the specter of Stalinism reborn. Demands and tactics were elaborated that could unite many groups and that seemed to have some chance of success in influencing the political powers.

#### Regime's Response

The latest demonstration of official concern over the state of Soviet youth was the creation in December 1968 of standing commissions on youth affairs in both houses of the USSR Supreme Soviet. The commissions will be involved in drafting legislation on the education, vocational training, work, and recreation of young people.

By Western standards, it is difficult to explain the regime's anxiety over the current activities of Soviet youth. The distress is apparently a measure of what the regime thinks it owes to ideology as a justification of its rule. Implicit in the indifference and personal preoccupations of youth is a protest against the official order. The regime seems to fear that even the small demands for change that may arise out of such attitudes will work in the long run to undermine the fundamentals of the system and the prophecy of its doctrine. A totalitarian system regards any erosion, however small, as being of cosmic significance. Furthermore, Communists, always future-minded, are determined not to leave the development of their doctrine either to chance or to objective laws. Important, finally, is the character of the collective leadership that now rules in the Kremlin and the conservative bent of their personalities. At any rate, the regime has not hesitated to answer the

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smallest fault that it detects in the younger generation with more ideological indoctrination and more police control.

One official explanation for the shortcomings of youth argues that, because they have not suffered the hardships and struggles of past generations, they are not sufficiently appreciative of past achievements of the Soviet Union and have unwarranted expectations for the present and future. This official analysis lies behind the patriotic campaign launched in 1965 and directed specifically to the Soviet period of history. During the year 10 million youngsters allegedly visited battlefields, talked with old Bolsheviks and war heroes, and gathered materials for local patriotic museums. In August 1966, thousands of youngsters marched in Moscow with World War II weapons to climax the affair. The theme was, nevertheless, continued in saturation portions during the fiftieth anniversary celebrations of the Revolution in 1967 and of the Komsomol in 1968.

A series of measures has been taken since 1965 to improve the ideological training of the young. The role of the Komsomol has been expanded and repeatedly underlined in official pronouncements. In 1966 the entire system of ideological instruction in Marxism-Leninism was revised to put more stress on reading the "classics" rather than secondary sources. There is growing emphasis in military training on improving political discipline and attitudes. A new military law that went into effect in January 1968 makes premilitary training compulsory for all Soviet males under the age of 18 and, by shortening the length of military service, assures that nearly all young men will experience the ideological benefits of service in the armed forces.

Most recently, apparently under the influence of events in Eastern Europe, the role of the West in subverting Soviet youths has received special attention. Official pronouncements have named the young and politically immature as the special target of Western propaganda and have complained of Western attempts to split the generations by theories that

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replace the class struggle with the struggle between generations. The efforts to promote ideological purity and to root out any bourgeois tendencies were focused on the young in a series of nationwide youth and teachers' meetings during the spring of 1968, after the Central Committee plenum decreed an ideological crackdown in April.

Where preaching has not been successful, the regime has not hesitated to employ the police. In July 1966 the internal police administration was re-centralized in a new national Ministry for the Preservation of Public Order (MOOP) to deal *inter alia* with the problem of hooliganism. The same decree also strengthened the hand of the police in dealing with youthful criminals and specified harsher penalties for common crimes such as disturbing the peace and assault. Simultaneously, pressure was brought to bear through the press against those factories, farms, and other institutions which seek to protect members of their collectives who have fallen afoul of the law, and judges were urged to levy sterner sentences in cases of hooliganism. In November 1968, MOOP was renamed the Ministry of Internal Affairs (MVD), a title that recalls Stalinist repression, and additional measures were announced to strengthen the police forces.

Dissidents of a more intellectual cast have suffered a series of trials and sentences to prison camps. Over twenty Ukrainian intellectuals were tried in various cities beginning in 1965. Their activities apparently involved the circulation of underground literature and materials that branded them as nationalists in the eyes of the authorities. Censorship has been applied with an increasingly heavy hand since the ouster of Khrushchev and has been backed up by prosecution of writers who circulated materials surreptitiously or passed them to the West. Protests over these proceedings have been met by official demands for recantations, denial of privileges such as trips to the US and showings of modern art, and dismissal from professional and Party positions.

Authorities, finally, have sought to limit contact between Soviet citizens and foreigners. The vigilance campaign has stressed that all visitors

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**CROWD AWAITS VERDICT ON DEMONSTRATORS AGAINST  
INVASION OF CZECHOSLOVAKIA, OCTOBER 1968**

from the West are potential spies and subversives. Newsmen from Communist and non-Communist countries were warned in early 1968 against unauthorized contacts with Soviet citizens. Similar warnings to Soviet citizens have practically dried up the American Embassy's contacts with young intellectuals. A Polish cultural counselor in Moscow has complained that relations between Poland and the USSR in the fields of music, sculpture, and the theater have dwindled to almost nothing.

Two things may be noted concerning the tactics of repression: they are aimed across the board at intelligentsia, young and old, and they are designed to keep the symbols involved smaller than the message conveyed. These characteristics are well illustrated by the case of Ginsburg and Galanskov. The regime chose to move against younger dissidents, of little prominence, involved in the not entirely honorable business of smuggling written material to the West, on charges of subversive activities in collusion with an "enemy" emigré organization. All these factors limited the appeal of their case among the population



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at large. Protests were nevertheless heard, but they were confined to questions of legal procedures. The trial, however, was understood by all segments of the intelligentsia as a signal to maintain strict discipline in their own profession or activity. The regime did not hesitate to react to the protests, and, according to reports, did so most swiftly and severely against the prominent signers of the petitions. What punishment, if any, was suffered by the students and young professional people is not known but, after witnessing the submission of their better established elders to the administrative rod, little was probably needed. It is evident that students are the target, not of a particular policy of repression, but of a general policy. While this fact works to unite the generations of intellectuals and youths, so far this has been a unity in weakness. There has been no repetition of students assaulting authority in the streets while professors in the conference room stay the hand of authorities, such as occurs in other countries, both Communist and non-Communist. The authorities' hand will not be stayed.

By April 1968 the petition offensive had halted. With the invasion of Czechoslovakia in August, the completeness of the rout of the dissenters became more clear. In a sense the invasion was the sort of ultimate consequence that the narrower and legalistic protests had been designed to forestall. In the face of this actuality, the majority have stuck to silence. Two of the best known leaders of previous protests, Pavel Litvinov, grandson of Stalin's foreign minister, and Larisa Daniel, former wife of Yuly Daniel, organized a small demonstration against the invasion on Red Square on 25 August. They were promptly arrested and in October sentenced to exile. While the trial was occasioned by outspoken denunciations and political arguments on the street outside the court, little attempt was made to put objections on paper for the record. At this point the disaffected, young and old, seem to be overcome by the realization of the futility of their efforts and fear of the penalties that their continuation will likely provoke.

#### Prospects

As a whole, the young generation in the Soviet Union is not out to force sweeping changes in the

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Soviet system. This does not mean that they are pillars of the *status quo* or that the modifications they may encourage will not in the long run produce some fundamental changes. But their role will likely be an evolutionary one--one of reform, rather than revolution.

Pressure is building, however, to carry this role onto the political stage. This is a natural consequence of the conditions, the disillusionment with the political regime and its ideology and the development of personal ethics and concerns, that led originally to a withdrawal to the wings. Organized political activity on the part of the young, as the petition drive has demonstrated, is showing its first stirrings. Its realization is obstructed now only by the repressive power of the regime. Political action by the young, therefore, will have to wait until there is either a change in regime policies, the appearance of a faction within the leadership willing to champion the cause of the young, or a weakening of governmental authority until it can no longer hold off the young.

The likelihood of such transformations occurring behind the Kremlin Wall is a matter of speculation. The regime, however, is running some definite risks by its current heavy-handed exercise of power. Compromise with the young generation and their assimilation into the power structure becomes more difficult. There is the danger that under present conditions pressures may build and antagonisms may fester to the point where they may carry the ranks of youth to extremes of action far beyond their essentially conservative concepts. The current leadership's policy of retrenchment, following a period of compromise and hope, has already sharpened the urgency felt by many for guarantees and reforms. It is also encouraging the use of demonstrations and broadsides to attain these ends.

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## SPAIN

### Summary

Student demonstrations began over a decade ago in an effort to gain recognition for autonomous student organizations to replace the government-controlled student syndicate and to promote university reforms. During the 1967-1968 academic year, the demonstrations took a political turn when protests against the Franco regime itself were added. The government reacted by closing the universities involved for varying periods, arresting students, and using the police to put down the demonstrations. Police violence, however, only led to usually apathetic students joining the demonstrations. The threat of loss of academic credits if the university remained closed temporarily cooled the students' enthusiasm, but after new demonstrations in January 1969, the government closed indefinitely the universities of Madrid and Barcelona and declared a state of emergency to give police added power to head off rising student and political unrest. Now confident that it can put down any future demonstrations, the government plans to reopen the universities soon.

### Background

The current unrest in Spanish universities goes back more than a decade when students began to agitate for reforms in the official student organization and then for organizations of their own. By 1963 the movement to break away from the constrictions of the official student syndicate was well under way. Illegal student organizations of various political colorations were formed, and student demonstrations and strikes were conducted. The regime responded by imposing academic sanctions and by some use of the armed police.

In 1965 the government transferred disciplinary control of the University of Madrid from the Ministry of Education to the Ministry of the Interior. The expulsion of four professors for taking part in a student demonstration, the closing of some schools,

the occasional use of military courts to try arrested students, generally stiff civil penalties, and the regime's obvious unwillingness to meet all but minimal student requests slowly opened the way for the student protests to take on political ramifications. Antiregime attacks, especially in the more important universities in Madrid and Barcelona, followed.

In 1967-1968, demonstrations, now supported by growing numbers of students, perhaps sometimes as many as one thousand, were prolonged and intensified by the brutal tactics of the police, especially in Madrid and Barcelona. The students shouted anti-Franco slogans, and a bust of Franco was defiled. The demonstrations became so violent that the government closed the University of Madrid several times, and various university officials resigned in protest over police tactics. Barcelona had similar demonstrations, and the eleven other major universities had protests also, although on a lesser scale.

Finally a new minister of education was appointed in April 1968, and an agreement was worked out to keep the police off the campus unless summoned. These reforms, however, were not enough. Student demonstrations began again in December over dissatisfaction with the university authorities, the government, and the police. Fearing an increase in violence, in January the authorities closed indefinitely the universities



STUDENT DEMONSTRATORS, UNIVERSITY  
OF BARCELONA, DECEMBER 1968

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of Madrid and Barcelona. The government also proclaimed a state of emergency, suspending certain civil rights in order to permit the police more easily to control student and political discontent. Some students were among the approximately 1,000 persons arrested, and many were later released. But about 35 individuals, including at least 17 intellectuals and professors, were deported to remote Spanish provinces for the duration of the state of emergency.

Government sources said that the authorities wanted to avoid a crisis such as occurred in France last May. The universities, the government announced, would reopen in a few days but no new efforts to cause disorder and revolution would be tolerated. A government white paper on university reform was also promised soon.

#### Objectives

In addition to free student associations, the students want university reforms to correct the problems of overcrowded classrooms, the system of lifetime chairs filled by professors who are rarely seen by their students, lack of a student voice in their own university councils, and too little student-professor contact. On the international level, students have protested the presence of US military bases in Spain and the US role in the Vietnam war. The students are not seeking power for themselves, but do hope to help bring about radical change and, in some instances, the destruction of existing practices.

#### Groups Involved

The old picture of the average university student as an apathetic individual who takes to the streets only when urged on by a tiny minority of activists is being modified. The regime's recalcitrance and repression have brought a growing realization that a considerable number of students are demanding reforms. In the last few years, activists have appeared from extreme right-wing groups, moderate, democratically oriented groups, Social Christian groups, Social Democrats, Socialists, Marxists,

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Communists of all persuasions, and anarchists. Although official Spanish sources maintain that at the University of Madrid, for example, only about 200 students form the nucleus of the troublemakers, many more students have appeared willing to join the demonstrations.

International organization does not play an active part in Spanish student outbursts, but a sense of fraternity with rebellious students elsewhere in Europe is growing and contacts with French students have been made. These links are giving concern to the Spanish Government, which has taken steps to monitor and limit contacts. So far there has been very little cooperation between student and labor organizations. The fact that most university students are from the upper classes has made difficult the establishment of close relations with the workers.

#### Government Reforms

In May 1968, the government approved a decree aimed at urgent reform of the university structure. Key measures include the creation of new universities in Madrid, Barcelona, and Bilbao, new polytechnic centers in Barcelona and Valencia, and new schools in several other universities. New facilities, additional professors, and scholarships were announced, and limited student associations are to be permitted.

#### Prospects

Given the rapid politicization of students, the moves toward university reform may have come too late to prevent further trouble. Several years may well elapse before any meaningful progress toward meeting the problems of students can be made. Thus the chances of renewed student unrest are high. But the regime's readiness to use extreme measures to control the situation may reduce the level of overt student demonstrations.

## TURKEY

### Summary

Youth became a potent force in the last days of the Ottoman Empire and reached their zenith during April 1960 in the antigovernment demonstrations that opened the way for the military revolution the next month. Turkish youth are well-organized, although not united, and have a high degree of political awareness. They have repeatedly demonstrated a willingness to take their cause--whether local, national, or international--into the streets.

In general, the young intellectual elite is sanctioned through government subsidization and is consequently subject to a degree of government control. Politicians of both the left and right, of both government and the opposition, and incipient subversive elements all make overtures to the "Young Turks" in the hope of attracting their support.

### Nature and Scope of Youth Activism in Turkey

For nearly four decades--1923 to 1960--the Republic of Turkey maintained its independence under relatively stable civilian government and also moved constructively, if somewhat sporadically, in the direction of economic, social, and political modernization. There were no coups d'etat and only one major domestic eruption--the anti-Greek riots in Istanbul in 1955, which were apparently government inspired and, at least in part, government engineered. The students per se were not a major factor, but the youth certainly played an important role before the rabble took over and armored military units were required to restore order. But this event, which virtually all Turks regard as a blemish on Turkish history, was an exception.

Nonetheless, Turkish youth frequently have been an element of dissidence. They have used public rallies--usually at Taksim Square in the center of Istanbul or at Kizilay Square in Ankara--and fiery speeches, followed by attempted marches on the centers of government or to embassies and consulates, to make known their grievances. Placing a black wreath at some strategic location, as at the Ataturk monument in Taksim Square, is often a symbol of opposition. This tactic has been used in recent years by leftist students to protest

visits of units of the U.S. Sixth Fleet. Leftist groups opposing NATO or the U.S. presence in Turkey often are countered by rightist student demonstrations--sometimes leading to clashes and police intervention.

Recent grievances have included the Cyprus amnesty for political prisoners from the 1960 revolution, Turkey's membership in NATO, labor troubles at American installations, and close ties with the United States. Except for antigovernment demonstrations during the last days of the Menderes administration, the student organizations generally have remained aloof from strictly domestic politics. Individual student leaders allegedly have been linked from time to time with subversives, but the student movement as such has not been involved.

The students are generally agreed on the need for extensive educational reform. Even Prime Minister Demirel has publicly acknowledged the need for extensive changes in the educational system, especially at the college and university level.

#### University Conditions

The quality and, indeed, the quantity of institutions of higher learning, especially the universities, have failed to keep pace with the demands of a rapidly changing society, particularly since the end of World War II. These changes have included rapid population growth, increasing contacts with foreign countries, extensive foreign economic input which has brought the economy almost to the "take-off point," the spread of literacy and urbanization, and the growth of the middle and working classes. A social-cultural lag has led to tensions among all elements of society but especially among the youth. These tensions are aggravated by the growing disparity between the need of a rapidly developing society for highly trained manpower, and the limited number of qualified graduates from schools, colleges, and universities. Another source of tension is the limited number of universities and technical colleges available to the swelling ranks of lycee graduates.



In recent years only about one third of the qualified lycee graduates have been able to enter college or the universities. Other student grievances, some of which surfaced in the June 1966 student boycott and sit-in, have been the badly overweighted pupil-teacher ratio (many university lecture classes have over 1,000 students, many regular classes have 50 students, some laboratory classes have as many as six working together on the same experiment); overcrowded classrooms; lack of text books, stereotyped lectures, poor testing programs, virtually no chance for personal attention by members of the faculty, accompanied by a serious "brain-drain" of those students who graduate.

It is estimated that out of a total of some 12,300 medical doctors trained in Turkey, 2,250 are working or studying abroad. About 500 engineers, architects, and scientists are believed to have left Turkey for more promising prospects. Despite the great need for trained specialists there is also a lack of flexibility and receptiveness on the part of the universities toward students who have graduated from foreign schools.

It is difficult to gain admission to a Turkish university because of space, quotas, entrance examinations, and lack of housing. Once admitted, the chances of graduating are slim. A study of Istanbul University between 1957 and 1963 revealed that the percentage of graduating students never was higher than 28 percent and has been as low as 11 percent.

While the students, and would-be students, contend that reforms are necessary, university professors and administrators insist that the institutions long-standing ills can only be cured by cutting down on the number of students, and by insisting on higher levels of performance.

This year students representing practically every university and school of higher education struck for two weeks to protest the archaic methods, lack of facilities, the system of fees, and generally to indicate their united displeasure with

higher education in Turkey. They occupied university buildings, boycotted classes, sent representations to Prime Minister Demirel, and allegedly even threatened to burn down the University of Istanbul. Government and school administrators finally promised that the students' demands would be studied and changes would be made.

It is worthy of note here that while there were rumors of involvement by opposition parties and attempts by both the Marxist Turkish Labor Party and the clandestine Communist radio station *Bezim Radyo* (Our Radio) located in Leipzig, East Germany, to exploit the situation, there is no firm evidence that the unrest was planned, organized, or promoted by politicians at home or abroad. It was a bona fide student action aimed at correcting legitimate grievances; student leaders agreed to call off the strike when they were satisfied that an honest effort would be made to improve the educational system.

There can be little doubt that the student eruptions in Europe, France particularly, and in the U.S., encouraged the students to resort to a boycott and the occupation of school property. Turkey's universities are autonomous, for the most part; therefore, the government remained aloof. If the demonstrations had become violent or had spilled into the streets, the security forces undoubtedly would have moved to bring them under control.

A more typical example of Turkish student action on substantially the same grievances took place in 1964 when students got their message across by stretching a black ribbon across the main entrance gate to Istanbul University. The ribbon bore the words "OLD FASHIONED IDEAS." The student leaders then symbolically broke the ribbon and placed a black wreath in front of Ataturk's monument within the university grounds.

Educational deficiencies are equally bad at the secondary level where there is also a serious shortage of teachers. Basically the problem is one of tradition and cultural lag. The Ottoman heritage of rote learning pervades contemporary Turkish education, as

does the authoritarian role of the teacher. Little value is placed on discussion and deductive reasoning. Program content, especially in the social sciences, is the product of Turkish ethnocentrism and the deliberate effort of the government to instill a sense of nationalism.

In a 1960 report, the Turkish National Commission on Education underscored the major deficiencies in the educational system. These included: imbalance of male and female students; need for program diversification; almost total lack of extracurricular activities; failure to encourage individual initiative; unsatisfactory teaching methods due in part to poor training; overemphasis on factual memorization at the expense of personality and character development; and the rigid examination system. The Commission expressed the fear that frustration and discontent, resulting from an inability to continue their education, might render some students "dangerous to society."

Turkey's System of Higher Education

The fundamental distinction between peasant and elite in Turkey is one of education. Traditionally speaking, few doors were ever closed to the Moslem youth of whatever origin who could write and speak properly--and few were opened to those who could not. This was especially true by the end of the 19th century when Turkish society was divided between the ruling elite and the peasant masses. To a large extent this same division is present today, although there is greater opportunity to attain the educational prerequisite for membership in the intellectual elite and a high government job. Among the educated elite there are those who hold high office in government, and those who think they should.

The history of westernization or modernization in Turkey is largely the history of the development of secular education. It wasn't until 1900 that a civilian university was opened to train students for other than official careers. The French Lycee, exemplified by Galatasary, became the model for educational institutions at the secondary level, and French culture soon became the dominant influence.

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In the universities, however, German concepts prevailed. (Now after more than a decade of US assistance, including the establishment of a new university in the northeastern city of Erzurum, American educational concepts have become competitive).

By the end of World War I, and the ensuing Turkish War for Independence, the Turkish educational system contained, at least in rudimentary forms, all the basic components of the educational systems in what were then regarded as the "advanced nations." Ataturk closed the religious schools in 1924 and a national Ministry of Education assumed responsibility for all levels of public education. Today most of the universities are autonomous.

The largest university, the University of Istanbul, was established in 1933, and Ankara University, a consolidation of several previously unrelated faculties, was chartered in 1946. The growth of the university system has been accelerated as demands increased for university training. A university degree is a virtual prerequisite for a high-level government job; and teachers and bonafide students constitute two of the highest status groups in Turkish society. But it is the lycee degree which has become the dividing line between the upper and lower ranks of Turkish society. By Turkish standards, the graduate of the academic high school is an intellectual.

There are over 100,000 students, out of a total population of about 34,000,000, pursuing higher education. There are over 68,000 students enrolled in eight state universities, and about 26,000 others attend private, mostly technical colleges. Another 8,000 attend teachers colleges and theological schools, and several thousand are enrolled in technical schools at near-college level.

While autonomous, Turkish universities are chartered by the Grand National Assembly, and receive the bulk of their financial support from supplemental appropriations attached to the budget of the Ministry of Education. Only a nominal fee is charged, but the cost of books and room and board must be borne by the student. These are not too onerous for those who can live at home but clearly are beyond the

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resources of the youth whose family does not live near a university.

Since 1946, Turkish universities have been patterned largely after the German model with each subject within a faculty being grouped around a chair held by a professor, who in turn is supported by a cadre of junior faculty members. This method of organization, combined with the absence of a mandatory retirement age, severely limits promotion possibilities and lowers morale.

Enrollment is determined by each university faculty, which administers its own placement tests. A candidate often registers for several separate examinations. Students with lycee diplomas contend they are automatically entitled to admission, and the resulting clamor often forces university officials to allow still more students to enter already congested faculties. Over-enrollment is probably the most serious problem. In a law faculty at the University of Istanbul a teaching staff of 40 attempts to instruct 8,000 students. Existing resources such as libraries are often underused because of the emphasis on lectures. Except for a small core of able teachers, the bulk are mediocre and underpaid.

Istanbul University is the largest and most influential educational institution in Turkey. Built to accommodate 12,000 it has an enrollment of more than 30,000. According to the rector of the university, there are only 14,000 "real" students at the university; most of the others enjoy the fringe benefits of student status.

An estimated 3,000 Turkish students attend foreign universities each year, with US schools attracting a number second only to West Germany. Since World War II Turkish students abroad have concentrated on science and engineering courses. None are officially enrolled in schools in Communist countries, although probably there are some Communist exiles attending schools in Eastern Europe. The government has discouraged students from traveling in Communist countries but concedes that a few probably go via indirect routes. Student exchange may become an area of Communist exploitation now that relations with Turkey have become somewhat more amenable in the new

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age of detente. Underlying Turkish suspicions of the Russians, however, will probably hold down the number of students studying in the USSR.

National Youth Organizations in Turkey

There are three major youth and student organizations. While most youth are affiliated with one or more of the national organizations, there is no acknowledged central leadership among the nation's youth. In addition to the student unions, there are also youth branches of many of the national political parties, especially the ruling Justice Party (JP), the major opposition Republican People's Party (RPP), and the Marxist Turkish Labor Party (TLP). There are also smaller, somewhat less organized groups, possibly cutting across party lines, drawn to individual political leaders.

The three national organizations are the National Youth Organization of Turkey--(*Turkiye Milli Genclik Teskilati*--TMGT), the National Student Federation of Turkey--(*Turkiye Milli Talebe Federasyonu*--TMTF), and the National Turkish Student Union--(*Milli Turk Talabe Birligi*--MTTB). The TMGT, officially recognized in 1960, includes both student and other youth organizations such as the Boy Scouts Union, the Women's Union of Turkey, the Turkish Reform Hearths and the Textile Workers Federation. It has nine member bodies, of which the TMTF is the most important, and is government subsidized. In 1964, the last year for which we have statistics, the TMGT claimed a membership of some 274,000.

The TMGT is leftist dominated, despite persistent government efforts to gain control. Most of its present leadership is said to be friendly to the opposition, hostile to the Demirel government, and, although basically pro-West, critical of the terms of Turkey's relationship with NATO and the US.

With a membership at least of 100,000, and chapters on all college and university campuses, the National Student Federation (TMTF) is the larger and more politically active student organization. The TMTF was founded in 1946, has its national headquarters and over half of its members in Istanbul, where the Istanbul University Student Union (IUTB) with 21,000 members often is able to play a dominant role in TMTF affairs.

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The TMTF is today split into left and right factions--both of which elected slates of officers in separate congresses in 1966. Since then, the Federation has been rent by internal strife, court action, and open clashes.

Leftist control of the TMTF was temporarily ended in January 1967 by a court order which appointed trustees to administer it. The leftists subsequently defied the court and were arrested. They nonetheless established a rival TMTF headquarters in Ankara and probably have the larger national following. The Istanbul leadership reportedly continued to control the organization's teletype system, bank accounts, and the bulk of its files. The government has announced that it will seek legislation to end control of student organizations by "professional student" politicians. A similar attempt to tighten control of the student organization leadership in 1964 failed.

On 18 January the High Court of Appeals reversed the decision of the lower court and returned control of the TMTF to the leftist leadership. The youth struggle now appears to be polarizing between the far left and far right groups represented by the leftist Federation of Idea Clubs--sponsored by the Marxist Turkish Labor Party (TLP)--and the young "commandos" being trained by the rightist Republican Peasant Nation Party (RPNP) led by neo-fascist, retired Colonel Alpaslan Turkes.

The National Turkish Student Union (MTTB), founded in 1916, is the oldest student organization and with some 60,000 members in 27 separate affiliated organizations, is more conservative than the TMTF and is comparatively free from government control. Whereas the TMTF is more interested in student problems, the MTTB is oriented toward such political questions as Cyprus, East Turkestan, and the Orthodox Patriarchate. It tends to be strongly nationalistic and has tried to maintain close bonds with the military hierarchy.

Both the TMTF and the MTTB utilize press conferences to proclaim how the "Young Turks," in the sense of the Youth of Turkey, feel about hot issues of the day. Both publish periodicals and both, on

occasion, send deputations to the prime minister or other government officials in an attempt to make the influence of youth felt by the leaders of government. Talks regarding the merger of the two national student organizations have been going on intermittently since 1963 with the conflicting ambitions of the various leaders apparently constituting the chief obstacle. The development of a strong leftist movement in the TMTF would seem to preclude any serious hope of merging the two organizations in the near future.

It has been suggested that leftist influence among the teaching staff at Istanbul University has grown in recent years and that newcomers have been variously identified with the left wing. It has also been alleged that these leftists have sought, with some success, to take over the leadership of the students as one element of the so-called "alert" or "standing forces" which include the intellectuals, the press, and the military.

Little factual information is available on suspected Communist groups although they probably exist and are probably concentrating on recruitment, infiltration of existing groups, and exploitation of student interest in left-wing ideas. But Istanbul University is no hotbed of Communism, and any such groups are probably very small.

#### Prospects

Turkish youth have the incentive, the political awareness, and the organization to play an increasing role in the country. They lack only a full sense of direction and a full awareness of their capability.

In contrast to the youth of many countries, Turkish youth generally appear to be little affected by cynicism or alienation; nevertheless, they do seem to be experiencing a growing uneasiness--probably due in large part to the frustrations inherent in an outdated educational system, which are enhanced by leftist propaganda. The student disturbances in Turkey last spring appeared to have no obvious political overtones, except for the violent demonstrations against the Sixth Fleet units that visited Istanbul in July 1968.



The violence then may have reflected both the frustrations of the student boycotts and the indecisiveness of the police; the most important factor, however, probably was agitation by leftists who exploited the fleet visit to embarrass the Demirel government and to demonstrate leftist opposition to Turkey's membership in NATO and to the US military presence in Turkey.

Widespread fear of serious trouble at the Turkish universities when classes resumed last fall did not materialize. Some students apparently were satisfied with the conciliatory attitude shown by school authorities; others were probably impressed by the firm public warnings by both government and opposition leaders. A few feeble efforts to resume student boycotts as a protest against continuing educational grievances soon faded. Nevertheless, in marked contrast with student activities the previous spring, by the time school reopened in November the student activist movement had taken on a distinct political coloration. Furthermore, student leadership appeared to be better coordinated, targets had been broadened to include "economic imperialism" and "foreign investment," and there were increasing indications that leftist leaders intended to try to exploit any student demonstration into anti-regime and anti-US affairs. Following the Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia in August, the anti-NATO campaign became unpopular and was temporarily silenced, but it was by no means abandoned.

During recent months, student leftists, almost certainly under the general guidance and direction of the Marxist Turkish Labor Party (TLP) and with at least token financial support from Soviet representatives in Ankara, tried to mount several major anti-American demonstrations. These efforts were largely frustrated by government restrictions, by close police surveillance, and by the lack of popular interest.

Not to be outdone by the leftist students, rightist youth groups, such as the National Turkish Student Union (MTTB) and the Struggle Against Communism Society, are trying to become organized for more effective counteraction. Rightist "commando" groups have been organized and reportedly are being trained

by the Republican Peasant Nation Party headed by neo-fascist retired Colonel Turkes. This polarization of leftist and rightist youth groups increases the danger of serious incidents growing out of any demonstration. Some political observers believe the leftists are purposely promoting such a polarization in order to enhance the political tension within the country.

The recent burning of Ambassador-designate Komer's limousine by leftist students on the campus of the Middle East Technical University in Ankara, while probably a target of opportunity, appears to have been in line with a calculated leftist campaign to undermine US - Turkish relations. Some observers see the real objective of the leftists as the creation of sufficient dissension within the country to fragment the government. They further theorize that a weak coalition would become a necessity, which in turn would foster further polarization beneficial to the extreme left. There also seems to be a general consensus that the leftists intend to attack the Demirel regime by undermining US - Turkish relations, that Turkish officials generally are not yet fully aware of the inherent dangers in the situation, and that Ankara's handling of the leftist problem thus far has been inept.

The apparent shift in focus from purely academic grievances to political targets points to the probable manipulation of the students by elements outside the universities. The presence of outside influences is further indicated by the increasing polarization among the students, some of whom reportedly have joined pro-left organizations for self-protection. This growing polarization almost certainly will lead to a marked increase in the number and intensity of student clashes and isolated acts of terrorism, and may encourage isolated leftist attacks on US property and nationals. An added danger is that religious fanaticism among some of the supporters of the right may spill over into the streets thus heightening the atmosphere of unrest.

The government is preparing legislation designed to help control the spread of extremism within the country and has ordered provincial governors to

tighten law enforcement within their jurisdiction. With memories of the student demonstrations that preceded the 1960 revolution firmly in mind, however, Turkish officials probably will be somewhat less than enthusiastic in any action that they may feel forced to take against the student left.

The current mood of a major segment of the Turkish youth, and of leftist-inclined students in particular, is anti-American. In the absence of firm action by the government, demonstrations of anti-Americanism probably will increase both in number and intensity during the coming months. Under the influence of anti-Americanism, the student left will view the periodic visits of multiple units of the US Sixth Fleet to the port of Istanbul as particularly attractive targets.

Forty-two percent of the population of Turkey is under the age of fifteen; and the youth are, and will continue to be, a major factor in the country's political life. The youth of Turkey have been given a heady assignment--to be the ultimate "guardians of the Revolution." Where this leads to responsible political activity it is an asset. Where it leads to narrow, chauvinistic nationalism or leftist adventurism, as in the near catastrophe over Cyprus, it remains potentially dangerous.

The bulk of the politically active students can be expected to remain anti-JP, anti-American, and to call for closer relations with the socialist countries.

## YUGOSLOVIA

### Summary

A decade of apathy on the part of the youth of Yugoslavia ended last June, when Belgrade University students rioted and a week-long university sit-in followed. Although partially inspired by the example of rioting students in Poland, France, Czechoslovakia and other European countries, the Belgrade riots were, as Tito admitted on 9 June, largely domestic in origin. The regime's slow reaction to a deteriorating economic and social situation and its sluggishness in dealing with youth and educational problems had been at fault.

Yugoslav students left school following their demonstrations last June in a triumphant mood. They were, however, quickly disillusioned during the summer when the regime cracked down on liberal university elements and took no action to meet student demands that Tito himself had labeled legitimate. Students and party authorities appeared to be on a collision course likely to erupt into large scale disorder when school reopened in September.

The invasion of Czechoslovakia on 20 August eclipsed this problem, as nearly all Yugoslavs united behind Tito and the party in the face of the potential threat from Moscow. The record number of young people that joined the party during this period leavened the youth movement and Yugoslavia's youth organizations may gradually divide into smaller more autonomous units in order to accommodate divergent views. Events in Czechoslovakia have also made participation in international conferences by Yugoslav students increasingly difficult and have led to serious public clashes with their counterparts from the Warsaw Pact states.

### Students Versus the Regime

The June riots started with a trivial clash between young people at a musical performance on 2 June. The disturbances soon took on a political character when student anger at police tactics and pent-up frustration over the lack of job opportunities resulted in sweeping demands for

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change. An ad hoc student action committee quickly formulated a four-point program which demanded:

- Removal of all antisocialist manifestations and economic and social differentiation.
- Steps to remedy unemployment and reduced job opportunities for university graduates.
- Greater democratization of all social and political organizations, a more independent press, and quicker removal from office of antireform "conservatives."
- A thorough reform of the university, to provide greater autonomy, a student voice in university affairs, and improvement in the living conditions of students.

The regime opted for conciliation combined with firmness: Its spokesmen were quick to concede the justice of the students' demands, but deplored the demonstrations and violence.

Several Serbian officials, including the president of the Serbian parliament, were appalled by police brutality and promised to investigate and punish the guilty. Cognizant of the developments in Paris, the regime set out to keep the students and workers from uniting on the basis of mutual economic grievances. The Belgrade press was filled with telegrams--probably regime-inspired--from factory committees who supported the students' "just" demands, but denounced student violence and pledged adherence to the regime's programs. The regime succeeded. No workers joined the students or started sympathy strikes.

The sit-in at Belgrade University did not end, however, until 9 June, when Tito admitted on television that there had been delays in implementing the economic reform, in eliminating "shocking" salary differences, and in dealing with youth problems and educational reform. Reminding his audience that the party had been debating all these problems for many months, he asked the youth to push his reform programs. Tito promised new party guidelines

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to deal with domestic problems--indicating that they would be final and non-negotiable. Although Tito implied that if he and the rest of the leadership could not solve Yugoslavia's problems they should resign, he gave no hint that he would bow to the students' demand that those responsible for police brutality be sacked.

The economic guidelines, in preparation since 20 May, were published five days later. In part an elaboration of the themes in Tito's speech, they called for economic reform and reorganization of the party. They also echoed student demands for limits on income acquired in a "nonsocialist" way (leasing of villas, for example) and a reduction of differences in wages. They allowed for educational reform and more student participation in the management of the universities.

Again there was a note of firmness. The resignation of incompetent officials was implied, but there was a clear warning that "enemy forces," such as antiregime emigre groups, antireform conservatives, and ultraliberals, were seeking to undermine Yugoslavia. Emphasis was put on using and improving the existing Yugoslav system, albeit with a major effort to make room for more young people. The guidelines re-emphasized the party's determination to oppose the creation of the multiparty system proposed by some liberal intellectuals.

Student unrest had occurred at a trying time in the regime's three-year-old drive for economic reform. Although the students exhibited no separatist tendencies, the regime in meeting the students' demands had to take into account the tense nationality situation. Republic economic rivalries had increased. Many Serbs believed that they had suffered by the reform, while the Croats generally believed that the process should be speeded up. For the first time in many years Tito was under pressure from both the conservative and liberal wings of the party from the first to go slow and from the second to move ahead faster.

Economic reform brought increasing unemployment and labor unrest, with workers resorting to

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short strikes to push their grievances. Both the Belgrade students and many workers were angry at the high salaries and large bonuses paid factory administrators while workers in some enterprises remained poorly paid or paid only after long delay.

Early Summer

The leadership's approval and support of student demands, highlighted by President Tito's conciliatory television address of 9 June, was a major factor in calming disorder during the student riots last June. After the students had dispersed for vacation, however, the regime became increasingly critical of the student movement and worked against more autonomy for the universities and a greater student voice in university affairs, both promised in June.

During July virtually every major Serbian party organization launched attacks on certain individuals and party organizations at Belgrade University. A session of the Belgrade party city conference developed into a major indictment of "liberal elements" at the university, and Belgrade party chief Vlahovic made it clear that all necessary steps would be taken to eliminate these elements. The session concluded on 19 July by dissolving the party organization within the departments of philosophy and sociology for their antiregime behavior during the student riots in June.

The hardening of the Serbian leadership's position on dissident intellectuals and students who support them was echoed by the Croatian party. The faculties of philosophy and political science at Zagreb University were the targets of a succession of stormy party meetings resulting in mutual recriminations and threats of disciplinary action against professors and students. Dissident professors, however, continue to have a significant influence within the university's basic party organizations, and Croatian party officials have not been able to regain complete control over them.

Certain issues of the Belgrade and the Zagreb University's student reviews have been banned and

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continued pressure to close down or shake up the editorial staffs of these publications could escalate student-party tensions. Suppression of some student publications has continued at Zagreb University but has been abandoned at Belgrade University.

After Czechoslovakia

The occupation of Czechoslovakia and the fear that Yugoslavia was to be the next victim of the Russians completely overshadowed internal problems as the populace rallied behind the federal authorities. Appealing to patriotism, unity and internal strength, the party launched a successful drive to bring in more youngsters. It is rumored, also, that militant student leaders have been called into military service. The kind of street action that erupted at Belgrade University last June will not be repeated as long as alarm over a possible invasion continues in Yugoslavia.

It is currently estimated officially that about 75,000 young people joined the party following the invasion of Czechoslovakia. These figures do not include new members in the Yugoslav armed forces, and is impressive when compared with last year's very modest figure of 23,235 new members. This upsurge marks a sharp reversal of the process which had seen Yugoslavia's party membership steadily declining. It will add new vigor to the party, give it a more youthful composition, and strengthen those elements who support the party's reform programs.

Many students realize that joining the party will detract from the effectiveness of continued student opposition. Those students who have joined the party find themselves effectively neutralized and at the same time alienated from those who refused to join. As a result, there are no realistic possibilities for concerted student action in the near future and the party can afford to be tolerant.



The Generation Gap

The students' demands for jobs after graduation reflected more than a narrow-minded self-interest. There is a profound difference in outlook between the young and old, and the regime must cope with a widening generation gap.

The bulk of the leadership at all levels in Yugoslavia has remained the same for over 20 years. Despite the purges of Cominformists in the years immediately following 1948 and the ouster of Djilas (1954) and Tito's former heir apparent Rankovic (1966), the hard core of the party still has great numbers of older ex-partisans and prewar members. The upper levels of the party hierarchy are particularly laden with this older generation. "Older generation" here, is relative: Most of these "older" people are in their fifties, some still in their late forties. Tito at 76 is by far the oldest of the hierarchy.

The regime has attempted with only limited success since 1963 to enforce a policy of "rotation" in office in order to bring up younger men. While the average age of the party leadership has declined slightly, the old guard has departed only slowly in a Yugoslav version of political musical chairs. Thus the party reorganization of October 1966 resulted in an executive committee (polithuro) of relatively younger and less politically influential men, while almost the whole old-line leadership was shifted into the policy-making presidium.

What has been true of the top leadership has been even more evident at the lower levels of the economic and political ladder. Many factory directors and lower level bureaucrats owe their positions to their prewar party and wartime partisan service. Many are ill-educated and not equipped to deal with the sophisticated socialist market economy which the regime hopes to create. Understandably, they do not wish to give up the income and status they feel that they deserve.

Partly as justification for its privileged position, the older generation for years has exploited wartime sacrifice and glory. The values of many of these older people are an admixture of unsophisticated Communism, middle-class aspirations, pride in what they have accomplished, and, in some, a residual local nationalism.

Meanwhile, universities have been turning out thousands of better educated young technicians. Many are impatient with the bungling of their elders and with the barriers to jobs and influence which the latter have created. Tito himself has publicly admitted many times that the Yugoslav economy badly needs thousands of better trained men, and has complained that many enterprises refuse to hire them.

The slogan "Down With the Red Bourgeoisie" which appeared at Belgrade University in June underlined the younger generation's disenchantment, their wish for an end to privilege built on party or partisan service. This demand was not new--it simply became louder. In the months after the ouster of Rankovic the Yugoslav press burgeoned forth with reports of illegal building of villas and the accumulation of art treasures and private wealth by party functionaries.

The restlessness of Yugoslav youth reflects the success of the regime in its liberalization program. The curtailment of the power of the secret police following Rankovic's fall, the enhancement of parliament, more open elections, and curtailment of direct government control of the economy--all have fostered a more permissive atmosphere. Many of the students' demands were inspired by the hopes engendered by the liberalized Yugoslav constitution of 1963 and by promises implied in the current party program. Conversely, the regime's compromises in the face of opposition by conservatives who still hold influential positions and the objective difficulties of the economic reform probably seemed intolerable obstacles. When the chief of the Belgrade party organization, Veljko Vlahovic, a leading ideologue and presidium member, attempted to speak to the rioting students last June, he was howled down by the cry of "Enough words--action is needed."

It can be assumed that some children of party officials were involved in the riots. Their presence did not inhibit the police, but it may help explain the regime's forbearance in the face of the sit-in at the university and the release of all the students arrested earlier during the riots.

### The Youth Organizations

The student unrest reflected in the June riots revealed the ineffectiveness of the two main regime-sponsored youth organizations--the Federation of Youth of Yugoslavia (SOJ) and the Federation of Students (SSJ).

Both federations originally were created to perform as "transmission belts" for party directives and propaganda. Numerically at least, the SOJ has been a success--its membership (2,034,523 in December 1965) includes about two thirds of all Yugoslavs between the ages of 14 and 25. Resentment over the Federation's position as "transmission belt" has grown steadily over the years, and much of the organization's membership is pro forma. The SOJ became a byword for careerism and a haven for young party hacks.

The party's decision in 1965 to change its role from that of an all-powerful, operational organization to one of ideological leadership led to confusion. Many young people wanted the Federation to reflect the views and interests of its membership, not those of the party. The SOJ, however, was not organized to respond to pressure from below. Its leadership, moreover, was all over 30 years of age, which led to charges of overprofessionalization.

In the aftermath of the fall of Rankovic the youth federation secretariat was dissolved (November 1966) for incompetence and heavy handedness. The Federation was put into a form of "receivership" in order to prepare for its reorganization, which took place over a year later at the Eighth SOJ Congress in February 1968.

Tito's speech opening the Congress offered nothing particularly new. It was a call for more of the ideological guidance the young had already come to dislike. Indeed, instead of innovation, Tito pointed with alarm to the need for the SOJ directing more ideological political work toward intellectuals, among whom he detected apathy and "alien concepts."

To restore the SOJ's effectiveness, a new statute was enacted decentralizing administration, presumably to make the federation more responsive to its membership. What emerged was a compromise between the old strongly centralized organization desired by the conservatives and the loose coordinating body called for by the ultraliberals. The age limits were widened to include 14 to 27-year-olds; a 27-year-old was elected president.

The considerably smaller (110,000 members in 1966) Federation of Students suffers from much the same malady as the Youth Federation. If the regime grants the SSJ the autonomy necessary to attract large numbers of activist students, the party risks losing control. Tight regime control, however, results in further alienation of the future intelligentsia and technocrats and an organization steeped in apathy.

Regime control of the students through the SOJ and the SSJ broke down at the time of the Belgrade riots, when the groups were reduced to supporting, ex post facto, the student demands while condemning demonstrations and violence. Effective leadership had passed to student action committees not in the party's sway.

The organization of the youth movement in Yugoslavia is rapidly decentralizing. Youth organizations are reducing considerably their connections with their former parent body, the SOJ. Last December members of the SSJ in Serbia and Macedonia sent observers instead of delegates to the Youth Federation Congresses of their respective republics. This tactic was designed to emphasize the independence of the SSJ. In Slovenia the students have gone a step further by announcing their intention to withdraw from the SSJ to form their own independent Slovenian student federation.

These actions have drawn sharp criticism from several fronts, but some higher authorities apparently are willing to tolerate such an emancipation rather than contribute to unnecessary conflicts with the students. The Slovenian threat to withdraw has not materialized yet, but it is likely that the eventual resolution of the matter will take the form of a significantly democratized student movement. The students want an organization more responsive to its membership and consequently less a vehicle for transmitting party policy. This trend may also lead to the fragmentation of the youth movement into students and nonstudents, which might be accompanied by increased militancy on the part of the purely student organizations.

The Students and the Schools

Early in 1968 the youth periodical *Mladost* revealed that out of 3.5 million employees in Yugoslavia, about 200,000 have had no schooling, over 1.2 million have never finished the eight-year elementary school, and only 800,000 have an elementary school education. The drop-out rate for elementary schools is about 50 percent. The illiteracy rate remains high, about 20 percent, with about 50 percent of the illiterates under 50 years of age.

In part, the problem stems from limited financial resources. Under legislation passed in 1966, local communities are responsible for financing most basic education. Local enterprises are encouraged to contribute loans and scholarships. Decentralized financing has resulted in uneven quality in the primary and secondary school systems. Poorer areas naturally have inferior schools, particularly in the villages. Peasant youth are at a disadvantage if they wish to pursue university studies.

University education is tuition free. Cost of living grants are available and many students receive loans, repayable over a ten-year period after graduation. The debt is reduced for those with good academic records and those who finish their studies early. Poor preparation and personal financial problems probably are the main reasons so many students take extra years to earn a degree.

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The increased cost of living since 1965 has been another factor barring the way to higher education for the children of workers and peasants. In 1965 the average stipend for students at Zagreb University, in comparatively wealthy Croatia, was 15,000 old dinars (OD) per month. At the current exchange rate of 1,250 old dinars to one dollar, this amounts to \$12. Living expenses, however, reached the level of 29,000 OD (about \$23). In the past three years stipends have not kept pace with the cost of living. The average worker's wage (not including self-employed peasants, the bulk of the rural population) in January 1966 was 57,000 OD (about \$46). Moreover, the highest average salaries were in the more developed northern republics. This economic inequality is transforming Yugoslavia's universities into preserves for the children of highly paid business managers, professional men, and party and government bureaucrats. According to one Yugoslav source, in February 1968 only 13 percent of the children of blue collar workers were receiving higher education.

Student discontent also has been stimulated by the party's reluctance to loosen its grip on the universities. Although "self-management" and university control of its own finances has been constantly ballyhooed, university party organizations have usually had to bow to the wishes of their LCY superiors. Party influence in faculty appointments has resulted in providing sinecures for second-rate but "safe" intellectuals. Only in the past four or five years have liberal professors become more publicly outspoken in their criticism of the regime's policies. Yet as late as June 1967, a dogmatic, authoritarian, second-rater, Dr. Dragisa Ivanovic, was elected rector of Belgrade University over his liberal opponent, Dr. Veljko Korac. Korac had made the mistake of publicly doubting the ability of ill-educated workers to manage increasingly complex business enterprises and to contribute meaningfully to the solution of complicated social and economic problems.

Korac is an example of the type of critical intellectual who is anathema to the anti-intellectual elements in the regime. The party has been particularly vehement in denouncing those who attempt to transform the intelligensia and students

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into an elite that would usurp the leading role of the party. It is a measure of the regime's desire to win support through liberalization, however, that such critics have been given ever freer reign, despite periodic threats by Tito to deal with their "alien concepts."

International Relations

According to the Yugoslav press, the Ninth Conference of Representatives of European National Student Unions held in Budapest 3-7 January largely foundered on the issues of the intervention in Czechoslovakia and the ideological differences in the socialist world emphasized by that event. The chief Yugoslav representative Vladimir Gligorov, who is also chairman of the Commission for International Cooperation of the Yugoslav Student Federation, characterized the conference as a failure, noting that no final communiqué was issued and the date and place of the next conference were left very much up in the air.

Gligorov crossed swords with the Polish representative over the question of the danger to socialist countries from internal reactionary forces and with the Soviet delegate on the limited sovereignty issue as it relates to the "socialist commonwealth." A speech by the Hungarian representative at a reception following the Conference, condemning those who came to break up the meeting with "subversive acts" caused the Yugoslav delegation to walk out. Gligorov also claimed that the Hungarians had at the start attempted to blackmail the Yugoslavs into silence on the Czech issue by threatening to discuss the nationalist demonstrations in Yugoslavia's autonomous province of Kosovo.

At about the same time as reports on the Budapest Conference reached the press another clash between Yugoslav and Soviet youth organizations was disclosed. In the 9 January issue of *Mladost*, weekly of the Yugoslav Youth Federation, the Youth Federation replied sharply to a letter sent by the Soviet Komsomol in early November in reply to a Youth Federation statement of its position on the Czechoslovak intervention. After replying to specific Soviet points the *Mladost* statement notes

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that the uncompromising Soviet concept of unity in the socialist camp is not a desirable foundation for cooperation between the Youth Federation and the Komsomol.

Conclusion

The past year has been a critical period in the relations between Yugoslavia's impatient youth and the Yugoslav establishment. The Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia has allowed Tito more time to establish the reforms that both he and the students know are necessary if Yugoslavia is to continue to progress. Tito wants to channel the youthful vigor stirred by the June demonstrations and the Czechoslovak crisis into the implementation of his reform programs.

Tito has made it abundantly clear that the party needs new blood, and all signs point toward a major rejuvenation of the party leadership at the Ninth Party Congress in March. The ascendancy of a young, competent, and generally liberal leadership in the Yugoslav party apparatus will be applauded by the youth and should in the long run lead to the solution of many of the problems that could have caused a direct confrontation between party officials and the younger generation.

Meanwhile, the Yugoslav Youth Federation will continue to be condemned as too "progressive" by Soviet-sponsored student associations, while its own members deplore its conservatism and "bureaucratic centralism." Yugoslav youth organizations probably will decentralize gradually under the watchful but tolerant eye of the party. This trend does not represent a spectacular departure from the norm in Yugoslavia and parallels similar moves toward local autonomy by the party itself, the government, the military, and other mass organizations.



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